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INTRODUCTION
A Blood Oath: Literature and Psychoanalysis
What would it mean to think death? We can think about death, around death. We can fear
death, avoid death, and mourn the deaths of others. But death itself seems unthinkable to us. Maybe
we can catch a glimpse of it for a moment – if we are tired and squint really hard, when we find
ourselves despairing, or when we drive past a gory roadkill – but then in an instant it is gone from
our view and from our thought. Death, in its terrifying unthinkability, establishes a limit in our life
and our knowledge of what life is. The natural law that death stops life forever is non-negotiable.
There has never been a commandment, “Thou shalt die,” because there is no transgression of this
that can be thought or effectively carried through. The after-life has no shape and no profile; as a
phenomenon, its only “elusive shapes” [schwankende Gestalten] are the shapes formed through
metaphors, stories, and myths.1 When we speak of the dead, we say they are “pushing up daisies” or
that they “bit the dust.” One day she “croaked.” He “kicked the bucket.” But none of these
representations of death ever speaks of death itself. Because death, understood as the end of life,
cannot be experienced, we think that death cannot be thought.
How are we to think about something that poses a limit to thinking as such? We might take
a speculative approach, as if we were looking through a spyglass to catch sight of an unidentified
object that is flying away from, or perhaps toward us. Eventually, though, we must look up and
continue on our limping path. Our feet hurt.2 We imagine that we are speculating about what is
above us and in front of us on our path. Similarly, when we speculate about death, we imagine that
This is the first line of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust.
Freud’s last lines of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle [Jenseits des Lustprinzips] quote “Die beiden Gulden,” a
version by Friedrich Rückert of a maqamat by Al-Hariri, an eleventh century Arab grammarian: What we cannot reach
flying we must reach limping… The Book tells us it is no sin to limp” [Was man nicht erfliegen kann muss man erhinken. / Die
Schift sagt, es ist keine Sünde zu hinken]. Freud, BPP, 78. JL 69. We should also remember that Oedipus also is a prince with
a limp. Freud also quoted these lines in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess of Oct. 20, 1895. Freud, The Complete Letters of Sigmund
Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 285.
1
2
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we are speculating about a death that will occur in the future. But what if the death we must
speculate about is also behind us or all around us? Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s famous line “stirb
und werde” or “die and become,” shows us how death can provide a new mode of becoming. By
careful misreading, we might speculate or theorize (or phantasize) that Goethe’s process of
becoming might be initiated by the death—the period of inanimacy— that comes before birth. 3 4
When we think of death as something that came before life, death-after-life can be thought of as a
return, and thus can become more thinkable. In this way, death is understood not only as a singular
event but also as a repetition: what occurred before life will occur again after life and recur again and
again continually throughout life. The many repetitions of life hold the most basic structure of
death, as both origin and end. Speculating on death in this way, we are reminded of Sigmund Freud’s
words from Beyond the Pleasure Principle: “It is surely possible to throw oneself into a line of thought
and to follow it wherever it leads out of simple scientific curiosity, or, if the reader prefers, as an
advocatus diaboli, who is not on that account himself sold to the devil” [Man kann sich doch einem
Gedankengang hingeben, ihn verfolgen, soweit er führt, nur aus wissenschaftlicher Neugierde oder, wenn man will, als
advocatus diaboli, der sich darum doch nicht dem Teufel selbst verschreibt].5
Freud published Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Jenseits des Lustprinzips) in 1920 – in the midst of
the Spanish influenza pandemic and two years after the end of the First World War – during a
period of mass death on a previously unimaginable scale. I began writing this project exactly a
century later, in a moment of uncanny historical repetition: the death toll from the COVID-19

For the quote “die and become” [stirb und werde], see Goethe’s poem “Blissful Yearning” [Selige Sehnsucht].
In “Analysis Terminable Interminable,” Freud makes this connection between theorizing and phantasizing:
“‘we must call the witch to our help after all’ – the Witch metapsychology. Without meta-psychological speculation and
theorizing—I had almost said ‘phantasying’—we shall not get a step forward.” Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 1964), Vol 23: 225. This quote references the Witch in Goethe’s Faust, who gives
Faust a rejuvenating potion per Mephistopheles’s request. This quote echoes the moment in Faust, when (referring to
Mephistopheles), Faust says: “Unless he can discuss a pas at length, / it might as well not have been danced. Steps
forward are what most annoy him” [Kann er nicht jeden Schritt beschwätzen, So ist der Schritt so gut als nicht geschehn. Am moisten
ärgert ihn, sobald wir vorwärts gehn]. Goethe, Faust, 4153.
5 Freud, BPP 71; JL 64.
3
4
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pandemic increases every day, and each time I read the news, I am confronted with the story of a
new mass shooting or another black man or woman who has been murdered by the police. There is
perhaps no better time than now, in a moment when death surrounds us, to return to the Freudian
death drive – a concept that was introduced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and has haunted us for a
century.

In Chapter V of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud describes the unimpaired movement of the
drives by turning to “the poet’s words” [des Dichters Worten]; 6 Freud says that the life drive “presses
ever forward unsubdued” [ungebändigt immer vorwärts drängt].7 The poet Freud refers to here is Goethe,
and these lines perfectly describe Goethe’s eponymous character Faust. But when we look more
closely at the passage from which Freud derived his quote, we learn that this line is actually spoken
by Mephistopheles, the character we may understand as Faust’s opposite, “the spirit that constantly
negates! / And rightly so! What has arisen / deserves to be annihilated” [der Geist, der stets verneint! /
Und das mit Recht; denn alles, was entsteht, / Ist wert, daß es zugrunde geht].8 This description recalls Freud’s
death drive [Todestrieb], which urges the subject on a circuitous path toward destruction and
disintegration; this drive presses the subject “to return to the inanimate state” [zum Leblosen
zurückzukehren].9 Just as it would seem that Mephistopheles and Faust are opposing characters in
Goethe’s Faust, the life drive and the death drive might be construed as antithetical forces in Freud’s
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. But in both cases, it is more complicated than this, and the dialogue

6 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961), 5; Jenseits des
Lustprinzips (London: Imago Publishing, 1940), 45. In the following citations, I will refer to these texts as BPP and JL. I
will not provide the German for non-primary texts that appear in the footnotes. If a non-primary text appears in the
body of my argument, I will provide the German as either a block quote within the body of my text or in a footnote.
7 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Faust (Berlin: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2017), 1851-1857. The translations I
provide are by Stuart Atkins, Goethe: The Collected Works: Faust I & II, Volume 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press),
unless otherwise noted.
8 Goethe Faust, 1338-1340. My translation.
9 Freud, BPP 46; JL 40.
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between these two texts helps to make this clear. As I noted in the Goethe passage that Freud
quotes, Faust is not describing himself; he is being described by Mephistopheles, and to make
matters even more perplexing, Mephistopheles is dressed “in Faust’s gown” [in Fausts langem Kleide].10
Because of this, we may wonder to what extent the description “pressing ever forward unsubdued”
[ungebändigt immer vorwärts dringt] describes Faust or Mephistopheles.11 Faust and Mephistopheles
become intertwined in this passage; similarly, Freud writes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle that the life
and death drives always exist in tandem. Freud and Goethe also become tangled in this key moment
when Freud turns to the “poet’s words” as if to put on Goethe’s clothes, as Faust does
Mephistopheles’s.
Freud’s relationship with Goethe invites a closer look. Avital Ronell writes in Fighting Theory
that “Freud saw in Goethe the starting point of psychoanalysis.”12 Goethe seems to cast a wide
shadow for many philosophers and poets living and writing in the German language after him.
Ronell writes specifically about the relationship between Goethe and his successors: “Freud said that
he couldn’t write anything while he was reading or close to Goethe. He frequently associated
Goethe’s name with a sort of paralysis… Goethe acts as a destructive force and, at the same time, as
someone who inspires a feeling of endless indebtedness.”13 Freud’s relationship with Goethe is
paralyzed in a state of ambivalence; indeed, Freud is just as wary of the world of poetry as he is in
awe of it. The poetry of Goethe seems to have inseminated Freud’s work; Goethe’s words live,
breathe, and grow inside of it. Ronell introduces another metaphor of the interiority and exteriority
between Goethe and Freud: “But writers do not simply admire their predecessors. They chow down
on them, introject them, and sometimes don’t manage to spit them out in time. Then the drama of

Ibid., 1851-1857. My translation.
Freud, BPP 5; JL, 45.
12 Avital Ronell, Fighting Theory (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 8.
13 Ibid., 8-9.
10
11
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incorporation takes hold and the undead exact their revenge.”14 In this way, we might playfully say
that Freud is impregnated, nourished, haunted, or perhaps even virally infected, by Goethe’s words;
in any case, he is unable to escape Goethe’s poetic-genetic material.
What is clear is that the relationship between Freud and literature is anything but clear. It is
undoubtedly ambivalent. On the one hand, Freud denounces the poets as vulgar con men, thus
falling in the lineage of Plato, who in the last book of The Republic informs us that the divorce
between philosophy and poetry was already considered an “old quarrel.” In order to describe this
ancient animosity between philosophy and poetry, Plato quotes several expressions from poets
about philosophy; these expressions deemed philosophy “the yelping hound barking at her master,”
and they identify “the band of philosophers who have made Zeus a slave” and they say that
philosophy is “mighty in the idle babble of fools.”15 But on the other hand, Freud also plays the role
of poetry’s greatest admirer and advocate. In Freud’s work there are countless moments of
intertextual references to the poets, and one of the most common referents is Goethe’s Faust. Freud
is suspiciously jealous of the poets, despite the fact that he goes to them seeking knowledge.
Freud knocks on Dr. Faust’s door like a humble student, but his knock is answered by
Mephistopheles instead. Mephistopheles, though, does not immediately provide Freud with the
knowledge he longs for. Instead, he withholds his knowledge according to the teaching: “The best
of what you know, you may not tell the pupils” [Das Beste, was du wissen kannst, / Darfst du den Buben
nicht sagen].16 The poets are Freud’s inscrutable teachers—they are for him what Jacques Lacan calls
“the subject supposed to know”—but their knowledge is concealed.17 Freud also follows the lead of

Ibid., 9.
Plato, The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 290.
16 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 166. Here Freud is quoting Goethe’s
Mephistopheles in Faust, 1840-1. This is one of Freud’s favorite quotes; he quotes them again later in the text on page
461, in multiple letters to Fliess on December 3, 1897 and on February 9, 1898, and he quotes these lines when he
receives the Goethe prize in 1930, at the end of his life.
17 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1998), 267.
14
15
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Mephistopheles insofar as he obscures his knowledge from the public, positioning himself in the
role of the scientist who conceals the very material he reveals. In the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud
admits to concealing various points of knowledge from his readers when he writes, “when I
interpret my dreams for readers I am obliged to adopt [similar] distortions” [wenn ich meine Träume für
den Leser deute, bin ich zu solchen Entstellungen genötigt].18 Just like the Delphic Oracle, Freud promises his
readers secret knowledge that resists revelation. This knowledge can only be revealed in a distorted
form akin to the dreamwork. In fact, one of the primary forms of the dreamwork, condensation
[Verdichtung], is related to the German word for poetry, “Dichtung.” Freud writes in the Interpretation of
Dreams that “there lies in dreams a marvelous poetry” [Der Traum hat eine wunderbare Poesie], and it
seems that the dream work and the poet use the same language of concealing and revealing.19 For
Freud, the work of the mind is akin to the work of poetry and, thus, the work of the analysis is akin
to the practice of reading. Fully understanding Freud’s project, therefore, necessitates the work of
reading and interpreting poetry.
Freud’s citations and references to Faust often appear at key moments in the process of his
argumentation; we might say that they are theoretical navels in Freud’s work. In an opaque moment
in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud turns his attention to what he calls the “navel” of the dream—
the piece of the dream which resists analysis:
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to
be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of interpretation
that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unraveled and
which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the dream. This is
the dream’s navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown. The dreamthoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things,
have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into the
intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point where this meshwork
is particularly close that the dream-wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its
mycelium.

18
19

Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, 166; Freud, Die Traumdeutung (Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 1914), 48.
Ibid., Interpretation of Dreams, 91; Ibid., Die Traumdeutung, 17.
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In den bestgedeuteten Träumen muß man oft eine Stelle im Dunkeln lassen, weil man bei der
Deutung merkt, daß dort ein Knäuel von Traumgedanken anhebt, der sich nicht entwirren will,
aber auch zum Trauminhalt keine weiteren Beiträge geliefert hat. Dies ist dann der Nabel des
Traumes, die Stelle, an der er dem Unerkannten aufsitzt. Die Traumgedanken, auf die man bei
der Deutung gerät, müssen ja ganz allgemein ohne Abschluß bleiben und nach allen Seiten hin in
die netzartige Verstrickung unserer Gedankenwelt auslaufen. Aus einer dichteren Stelle dieses
Geflechtes erhebt sich dann der Traumwunsch wie der Pilz aus seinem Myzelium.20
In every dream there is a point of obscurity, a knot which cannot be loosened up, a navel that
reaches down into a time before life began, before birth, that cannot be known. These dream
elements that occupy the position of the navel point toward a certain origin, but they have no
defined end; they move in every direction. This description of the navel provides us with a window
into the theoretical importance of Goethe’s poetry within Freud’s process of theorization. Just as
each dream has a navel which is umbilically linked to an unknown unconscious origin, so too do
Freud’s texts themselves possess a navel that is marked by references to Faust. The places where the
threads of Freud’s text become inextricably tangled are precisely the places where Goethe’s words
appear, shooting up out of the theory “like a mushroom out of its mycelium” [wie der Pilz aus seinem
Myzelium].
In the following chapters, I will examine the dialectical relationships within and between
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Goethe’s Faust, in order to illuminate the fraught relationship
between psychoanalysis and literature. Instead of applying Freud’s theory of the drives to Faust, I
will attempt to come to my own “Auflösung” or “solution” by allowing the two works to reveal,
unravel, and implicate each other. Shoshana Felman writes in the introduction to her edited volume
Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise that the word “implication” derives from
the Latin word “implicare,” meaning “being folded within.”21 According to Felman, when we examine
the way literature and psychoanalysis “implicate each other,” we may find that literature does not

Ibid., 528; 414.
Shoshana Felman, “To Open the Question,” in Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 9.
20
21
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exist “outside psychoanalysis, since it motivates and inhabits the very names of its concepts, since it
is the inherent reference by which psychoanalysis names its findings.”22 I hope to follow Felman’s
approach over the course of this project, and probe the extent to which “the poet’s words” are
embedded within Freud’s theories of death, the death drive, and repetition. Indeed, literature is
folded within psychoanalysis in the same way that Mephistopheles is folded within Faust’s clothes
and Goethe is enfolded within Freud’s.
I am therefore turning to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Goethe’s Faust I with a wish
to find a framework for understanding death in the time of the pandemic. In my first chapter, I
examine how Freud theorizes death in Beyond the Pleasure Principle in a way that is informed, clarified,
and complicated by the poet. In my second chapter, I turn to Goethe’s Faust in order to read the
language of blood as an analogy for the death drive, which I argue propels the drama onward. In my
final chapter, I discuss the respective endings of each text so as to understand more about the end of
life and to find a way to bring my project to a proper end. I conclude with some comments on
rhythm. Over the course of this project, I stand with Freud as an advocatus diaboli. In the end, I hope
to have demonstrated how we must read literature and psychoanalysis together in order to better
understand death and drive. These are the ideas I have in mind as I set out to read Freud and
Goethe on equal footing, side by side, as if they had written a contract signed in blood.

22

Felman, “To Open the Question,” 9.
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Death and Drive in Freud’s Beyond
Our unconscious is just as unreceptive to the idea of our own death, just as desirous of murder toward a stranger,
and just as divided (ambivalent) toward a beloved as the man of the primitive times.
Unser Unbewußtes ist gegen die Vorstellung des eigenen Todes ebenso unzugänglich, gegen den Fremden ebenso mordlustig, gegen die
geliebte Person ebenso zwiespältig (ambivalent) wie der Mensch der Urzeit.23

Death After Life: To Speculate
Beyond the Pleasure Principle is Freud’s first text to deal systematically with the (in)famous
drives: the life drive, also known as Eros, and the death drive, sometimes called (but not by Freud)
Thanatos. In this text, Freud takes a speculative approach in his move beyond the language of the
pleasure principle to provide a better method of understanding the treatment-resistant phenomena
that began appearing in the clinic after the war. 24 No matter how Freud approached the analysis of
patients who had returned from the war, it seemed that certain masochistic compulsions, traumatic
dreams, and uncontrollable symptoms, whose point of origin were unreachable by memory,
nonetheless continued repeating in his patients’ waking lives. Prompted by the presence of death
(and death-like symptoms) all around him and guided by his speculative approach, Freud was able to
think life and death in new ways. Likewise, if we seek to raise again the question of death, to think
death in new ways, we must throw ourselves back into Freud’s line of thought and follow it
diligently to see where it will lead. My inquiry into death will deal with Freud’s notion of the death
drive on the level of its repetitive structure. I will leave the notion of death as some impossible end
for later; I will focus instead on the death that happened before life and the repetitive deaths that
happen over the course of life. In thinking through death not just as the end of life, but also as the

23 Sigmund Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), Vol 14: 299. Freud, Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod
(Berlin: Vergangenheitsverlag, 2008), 21.
24
“What now follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which readers will appreciate or ignore
according to their particular perspective. Furthermore, an attempt to exploit an idea consistently, out of curiosity as to
where this will lead” [Was nun folgt, ist Spekulation, oft weitausholende Spekulation, die ein jeder nach seiner besonderen Einstellung
würdigen oder vernachlässigen wird]. Ibid., 18; 23.
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before of life and the content of life itself, I hope to follow Freud in the attempt to make death
thinkable.

Death Before Life: The Drives
Freud titles his text Beyond the Pleasure Principle, but he posits this “beyond” as something that
came before the pleasure principle. 25 This before can be understood developmentally as something
earlier in the evolutionary history of the living organism, but at the same time, it can be understood
as a kind of psychic primacy, on which all subsequent mental processes depend. 26 The text could be
considered a theoretical return to the earlier idea of the pleasure principle as well, because the notion
of the pleasure principle in the development of Freud’s thought came chronologically before the
ideas in this work.27 Freud’s Beyond is one of his most thought-provoking, but also one of his most
confusing and ambiguous texts. A more precise understanding of the primacy of the drives will help
to untangle some of the most difficult theoretical knots in Freud’s work.
What exists in the beyond that comes before the pleasure principle? In Chapter V, Freud
discusses the drives [Triebe], which are the “most important and the most obscure element of

What is the pleasure principle? J. Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis write in The Language of Psychoanalysis: “One of
the two principles which, according to Freud, govern mental functioning: the whole of psychical activity is aimed at
avoiding unpleasure and procuring pleasure. Inasmuch as unpleasure is related to the increase of quantities of excitation,
and pleasure to their reduction, the principle in question may be said to be an economic one.” (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1974), 322.
26
Freud asks us to imagine this hypothetical living organism: “Let us picture a living organism in its most
simplified form as an undifferentiated vesicle of a substance that is susceptible to stimulation” [Stellen wir uns den lebenden
Organismus in semer größtmöglichen Vereinfachung als undifferenziertes Bläschen reizbarer Substanz vor]. Freud, BPP 28-29; JL 25-26.
27 Freud became considerably less sure about the importance of an economic definition of pleasure and
unpleasure over the course of his career. While the early Freud maintained that pleasure corresponded to the reduction
of tension, later he became open to other possibilities, writing in Instincts and Their Vicissitudes: “We will, however,
carefully preserve this assumption in its present highly indefinite form, until we succeed, if that is possible, in discovering
what sort of relation exists between pleasure and unpleasure, on the one hand, and fluctuations in the amounts of
stimulus affecting mental life, on the other. It is certain that many very various relations of this kind, and not very simple
ones, are possible.” Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 1964), Vol 14: 109-40.
25
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psychological research” [selbst das wichtigste wie das dunkelste Element der psychologischen Forschung]. 28 29 The
drives come before the pleasure principle in order of importance; they are theoretically primary, but
they are also the most obscure element of the theory. The obscurity of the drives is due in part to
their interiority. The drives are the “representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of the
body and transmitted to the mental apparatus” [Die ausgiebigsten Quellen solch innerer Erregung sind die
sogenannten Triebe des Organismus, die Repräsentanten aller aus dem Körperinnern stammenden, auf den seelischen
Apparat übertragenen Kraftwirkungen].30 These drives, therefore, are of the body, and they move across
to the mental apparatus. They take part in what Freud calls the “primary psychical process”
[Primärvorgang]: the unconscious system, where investments [Besetzungen] can be, as in the dreamwork, completely “transferred, displaced and condensed” [übertragen, verschoben, verdichtet].31 The drives
are primary on the level of psychic importance and position in the mental apparatus.
The drives are then modified by the more advanced processes, which still remain
unconscious. The “secondary process,” the process which governs our waking lives, functions in a
higher stratum of the mental apparatus and aims to “bind the [drive] excitation reaching the primary
process” [Es wäre dann die Aufgabe der höheren Schichten des seelischen Apparates, die im Primärvorgang
anlangende Erregung der Triebe zu binden], in order to bring the system to its most stable and constant
form.32 33 When the secondary processes fail to come to completion, “traumatic neurosis”
[traumatische Neurose] may result.34 The binding of the primary drive-impulses by the secondary

Throughout this project, I will be using the word “drive” for the German word “Trieb.” This correction of
the Standard Edition translation of “instinct” for “Trieb” has become common practice.
29 Freud, BPP 40; JL 35.
30 Ibid., 40; 35.
31 Ibid., 40-1; 35-6.
32 Ibid., 41; 36.
33 Laplanche and Pontalis write that the pleasure principle and the reality principle together make up this
secondary unconscious process. The reality principle is one of the principles which operates in mental functioning. It
succeeds the pleasure principle developmentally, but never supersedes it. The reality principle modifies the pleasure
principle, in order to give the organism a mode of postponing pleasure as a result of external factors. Laplanche and
Pontalis, 324-5.
34 Freud 41; 35.
28
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process is necessary for the pleasure principle to govern the psychic apparatus. Indeed, this act of
binding and reducing the excitation level of the system is what is most important about the more
advanced unconscious processes, which include the pleasure principle.
As we see, these obscure drives are at work before the pleasure principle can dominate mental
life; they take precedence over the pleasure principle in the sense that they sequentially come before
it .35 Freud tells us that the drives function “not, indeed, in opposition to the pleasure principle, but
independently of it and to some extent in disregard of it” [zwar nicht im Gegensatz zum Lustprinzip, aber
unabhängig von ihm und zum Teil ohne Rücksicht auf dieses].36 Although the drives are not definitively
positioned in opposition to the pleasure principle, they can by chance come into conflict with it.
When the drives do happen to work against the grain of the pleasure principle and for a short while
appear to dominate mental life, they give the impression that there is “daemonic force” or
something of a “dämonischen Charakter” at work.37 In this respect, we can say that the drives exist in
proximity to the spirit world. Our contact with the drives is like our contact with ghosts or daemons.
These ghosts died before us, but now they have come back from the dead to haunt us again (and
again) over the course of our lives. They are uncanny, insofar as they should have remained hidden,

35

But Freud demands a amount of caution when thinking about the “dominance” of the pleasure principle. He
writes: “It must be pointed out, however, that strictly speaking it is incorrect to talk of the dominance of the pleasure
principle over the course of mental processes. If such a dominance existed, the immense majority of our mental
processes would have to be accompanied by pleasure or to lead to pleasure, whereas universal experience completely
contradicts any such conclusion. The most that can be said, therefore, is that there exists in the mind a strong tendency
towards the pleasure principle, but that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, so that the final
outcome cannot always be in harmony with the tendency towards pleasure,” [Dann müssen wir aber sagen, es sei eigentlich
unrichtig, von einer Herrschaft des Lustprinzips über den Ablauf der seelischen Prozesse zu reden. Wenn eine solche bestände, müsste die
übergroße Mehrheit unserer Seelen Vorgänge von Lust begleitet sein oder zur Lust führen, während doch die allgemeinste Erfahrung dieser
Folgerung energisch widerspricht. Es kann also nur* so sein, daß eine starke Tendenz zum Lustprinzip m der Seele besteht, der sich aber
gewisse andere Kräfte oder Verhältnisse widersetzen, so daß der Endausgang nicht immer der Lusttendenz entsprechen kann]
Freud 6; 5.
36 Ibid., 41; 36.
37 Ibid.
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but here they are. 38 Like a riddle, the drives are at once concealed and revealed.39 Like spirits, they
cannot be properly seen, and this is why they are the most important object of our speculation.
Freud’s drives originate within the body, they exist before the pleasure principle, and they
often are independent of (and occasionally oppose) the pleasure principle. But what is the aim of the
drives? What would it mean for the drives to have an aim in the first place? Later in Chapter V,
Freud writes:
It seems, then, that [a drive] is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier
state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the
pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to
put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.
Ein Trieb wäre also ein dem belebten Organischen innewohnender Drang zur Wiederherstellung
eines früheren Zustandes, welchen dies Belebte unter dem Einflüsse äußerer Störungskräfte aufgeben
mußte, eine Art von organischer Elastizität, oder wenn man will, die Äußerung der Trägheit im
organischen Leben.40
The drives came into existence before the pleasure principle, but they aim to reinstitute their
primacy in psychic life. In this sense, the drives are restorative; they aim to reestablish some older,
more primal state of things [ein Früheres].41 The drives move along a “circuitous path” [komplizierteren
Umwege] toward this goal; they are “an expression of the conservative nature of the living substance” [den
Ausdruck der konservativen Natur des Lebenden].42 Freud writes also that if the first forms of life were to
pursue an existence according to primary processes only, without secondary-process intervention,
then the “elementary living entity would from its very beginning have no wish to change; if
conditions remained the same, it would do no more than constantly repeat the same course of life”

38 Freud describes the uncanny in “The Uncanny” as “that species of the frightening that goes back to what
was once well known and had long been familiar.” Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1919), Vol. 12, 142.
39 Brian Tucker argues in Reading Riddles: The Rhetorics of Obscurity from Romanticism to Freud that the central quality
of a riddle is the interplay between concealing and revealing. Tucker writes: “The riddle then occupies the intermediate
field between these two extremes: it neither completely suppresses nor completely reveals” (Lewisburg: Bucknell
University Press, 2011), 18-9.
40 Freud, BPP 43; JL 38.
41 Ibid., 44; 39.
42 Ibid., 45; 41. Ibid., 43; 38.
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[Das elementare Lebewesen würde sich von seinem Anfang an nicht haben ändern wollen, hätte unter sich
gleichbleibenden Verhältnissen stets nur den nämlichen Lebenslauf wiederholt].43 Hence somewhat paradoxically,
the goal of the drives is not located somewhere in the future, but rather at something which has
taken place in the past.
The implication of this idea is that there is an earlier status – a before to life itself – that the
organism aims to repeat. The organism aims to return to the “inanimate state” [zum Leblosen
zurückzukehren] that preceded all life; I call this state the death-before-life.44 Freud writes that when
we look backwards, we see that “inanimate things existed before living ones” [Das Leblose war früher
da als das Lebende], because “what had hitherto been an inanimate substance endeavored to cancel
itself out” [in dem vorhin unbelebten Stoff trachtete danach, sich abzugleichen].45 This pursuit of the animate
substance demonstrates the relationship between repetition and negation. The primitive organism,
Freud speculates, lived and died at an extremely short interval. It was only “external influences”
[äußere Einflüsse] that led to a longer life for the organism, requiring “more complicated detours
before reaching its aim of death” [zu immer komplizierteren Umwegen bis zur Erreichung des Todeszieles
nötigten].46 These detours lead the drive astray briefly, but they also allow the drive to maintain its
original conservative aim. The word “detour” means “to turn aside” on a “roundabout or circuitous
way.”47 Likewise, “Umweg” literally means “way around,” and it implies a deviation from the straight
path. The detour or Umweg has the function of prolonging life and delaying the ultimate aim [das
Ziel], which is death. The aim of the drive, therefore, is to conserve the death that came before life.

Ibid., 45; 39.
Ibid., 46; 40.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 46; 41.
47 Freud describes his whole career as an Umweg in his autobiography: “My interest, after making a lifelong
detour through the natural sciences, medicine, and psychotherapy, returned to the cultural problems which had
fascinated me long before, when I was a youth scarcely old enough for thinking.” Freud, “An Autobiographical Study”
in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1919) Vol. 20: 141.
43
44
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The drives move according to this aim on a circular path that conserves and also repeats; when faced
with forces from outside, the drive takes the scenic route.
Hence paradoxically, the drives move forward in order to conserve, and they have an aim at
a death in the future that was also in the past. Freud asserts his twin theses: 1. “the aim of all life is
death” [Das Ziel alles Lebens ist der Tod] and 2. “inanimate things existed before living ones” [Das
Leblose war früher da als das Lebende].48 Life emerged from nonlife and is driven to repeat this state of
being. It is impossible for the drives to be conservative and also to repeat a state of things that has
never before occurred. Freud writes: “On the contrary, it must be an old state of things, an initial
state from which the living entity has at one time or other departed and to which it is striving to
return by the circuitous paths along which its development leads” [Es muß vielmehr ein alter, ein
Ausgangszustand sein, den das Lebende einmal verlassen hat, und zu dem es über alle Umwege der Entwicklung
zurückstrebt].49 A contradiction is present in this description. On the one hand, a drive is something
that continues forward. It is something that compels us to move from point A to point B. In
German, the word for drive, “Trieb,” has its roots in the Proto-Germanic “dribana,” meaning “to
drive, push, compel to go.”50 This is expressed in Freud’s use of the word “strive” [streben] as
characterizing their tendency. On the other hand, however, the death drive is striving toward the
complete cessation of movement.
Initially, following the notion of striving, it appears that the drives aim at a new Grund
[ground, base, reason, bottom] or Ziel [goal]. They are in constant motion, however circuitous it
might be, and it seems as if there must be an ultimate destination. It remains unclear whether the
purpose of such a revolution is aimed at a new ground or instead at the absence of ground

Freud, BPP 46; JL 40.
Ibid., 45; JL 40.
50 See “treiben” on Wiktionary Free Dictionary: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/treiben.
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[Abgrund]—if the drives aim at a Ziel or if they aim only to maintain their revolutionary motion.
Freud answers this question:
Every modification which is thus imposed upon the course of the organism’s life is
accepted by the conservative organic instincts and stored up for further repetition.
Those instincts are therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance of being forces
tending towards change and progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach
an ancient goal by paths alike old and new.
Die konservativen organischen Triebe haben jede dieser aufgezwungenen Abänderungen des
Lebenslaufes aufgenommen und zur Wiederholung aufbewahrt und müssen so den täuschenden
Eindruck von Kräften machen, die nach Veränderung und Fortschritt streben, während sie bloß ein
altes Ziel auf alten und neuen Wegen zu erreichen trachten.51
Freud himself pits this deceptive “change and progress” against the “ancient goal” of the drives. If
the drives regressively move toward this ancient goal, repression forces the drive in the opposite
direction, “towards change and progress.” While the unconscious drives aim to return, the repressed
drive is “always pressing forward” [ungebändigt immer vorwärts dringt].52 53 The drives can therefore
move backwards and forwards. How can the movement of the drives be both progressive and
conservative? Freud likens the motion of the drives to the movement of the earth around the sun:
just as the earth revolves around the sun, the drives take “circuitous paths” [alle Umwege].54 There is
harmony in this apparent contradiction: the drives develop; they move forward—but their
movement is circular. The most important characteristic of the drives is that, although they
conserve, they do not move backwards. When a sphere moves in circular orbit, a point behind the
sphere is also of course in front of it.55
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Freud, BPP 45; JL 40.
Ibid., 51; 45.
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This is a quote from Goethe’s Faust: “Ihm hat das Schicksal einen Geist gegeben, / der ungebändigt immer vorwärts
dringt, / Und dessen übereiltes Streben / Der Erde Freuden überspringt.” Goethe, Faust, 1856-60.
54 Freud 45; 40.
55 We might note that the celestial spheres do not take a circular shape, but rather an elliptical one. Shoshana
Felman describes Lacan’s discussion of the Copernican Revolution in her book Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight.
Lacan plays with this word ellipse, which in French has two different semantic centers: ellipse means the non-circular
geometric figure, and the word ellipsis is a rhetorical figure of speech that means omission, obscurity, or an eclipse of
language. In elliptical movement, there is always a round path; when moving along an elliptical line, the point where one
begins will always be intersected once more. But with an elliptical path, as opposed to a circular path, there are two focal
52
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Here we should take careful note of the previously discussed passage regarding the “more
complicated detours” that seduce the drives “before reaching its aim of death” [bis zur Erreichung des
Todeszieles nötigten].56 57 This problematizes Freud’s notion of the so-called “self-preservative”
[Selbsterhaltungstriebe] drive, which postpones the organism’s death.58 The self-preservative drive does
not, as is commonly assumed, work against death just because it postpones death, nor does it only
function to preserve, or conserve, the organism’s life. Rather, the self-preservative drive protects the
organism’s ability to die “in its own fashion” [auf seine Weise].59 Life itself is not necessarily at stake—
it is only a byproduct; what matters is the organism’s particular death. The self-preservative drive
only operates with respect to death. Often, these self-preservative drives are mistakenly juxtaposed
with the previously discussed drives, which are conservative. Freud maintains, however, that all of
the drives are conservative when he writes:
The [drives] which watch over the destinies of these elementary organisms that
survive the whole individual, which provide them with a safe shelter while they are
defenseless against the stimuli of the external world, which bring about their meeting
with other germ-cells and so on—these constitute the group of the sexual [drives].
They are conservative in the same sense as the other [drives] in that they bring back
earlier states of living substance; but they are conservative to a higher degree in that
they are particularly resistant to external influences; and they are conservative too in
another sense in that they preserve life itself for a comparatively long period.
Die Triebe, welche die Schicksale dieser das Einzelwesen überlebenden Elementarorganismen in
acht nehmen, für ihre sichere Unterbringung sorgen, solange sie wehrlos gegen die Reize der
Außenwelt sind, ihr Zusammentreffen mit den anderen Keimzellen herbeiführen usw., bilden die
Gruppe der Sexualtriebe. Sie sind in demselben Sinne konservativ wie die anderen, indem sie
frühere Zustände der lebenden Substanz wiederbringen, aber sie sind es in stärkerem Maße, indem
centers, and as a point moves along an elliptical line, it will not always be the same difference from the center. When we
speak about ellipses and ellipsis, like metaphor, there is simultaneous sameness and difference. This is what distinguishes the
language of the ellipse from the language of revolution, and this is what Lacan is trying to point out about Freud’s
Copernican Revolution, which is not just a return to origins, but also what Felman describes as the way in which “a
reflexive movement, in returning to and upon itself, in effect subverts itself—finds something other than what it had
expected, what it had set out to seek; the way in which the answer is bound in effect to displace the question; the way in
which what is revolving, what returns to itself, radically displaces the very point of observation.” Shoshana Felman,
Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 67.
56 Freud 46; 41.
57 By “seduce” I mean “to lead” (Latin: educere) “astray” (Latin: -se). See “seduce” in Wiktionary Free
Dictionary.
58 Freud 46; 41.
59 Ibid., 47; 41.
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sie sich als besonders resistent gegen äußere Einwirkungen erweisen, und dann noch in einem
weiteren Sinne, da sie das Leben selbst für längere Zeiten erhalten.60
Both the death drive and self-preservative drive press forward only to reach a point from the past.
They are progressive, because they move around a circle, as well as conservative. The death drive
strives to conserve a previous state of inanimacy and operates repetitively. The self-preservative
drive propels the living being forward in order to keep a path of its own, in order to conserve its
specific death. What is highly at stake for the self-preservative drives is the organism’s “own” death,
or rather the own-ness of their death, and with this own-death the organism’s particularity.
While the drives are equally conservative, Freud’s uses of the word “conservative” are
cleverly unequal. The death drive moves to conserve a previous state of inanimacy. If the selfpreservative drive were to be conservative in the same way as the death-drive, it would need to push
toward the previous state of selfhood before life began. This scenario would be supported by the
Aristophanes myth from Plato’s Symposium. In Chapter VI, Freud discusses this myth about an
androgynous being with four arms, four legs, and two faces, who was tragically torn apart and left to
desire their other half. After this division, in sex and erotic love, each half “threw their arms around
one another eager to grow into one” [sie umschlangen sich mit den Händen, verflochten sich ineinander im
Verlangen, zusammen zu wachsen].61 According to this myth, the modern individual lives only as a part
of what they once were, and in sex with a representative of their other half, they repeat an earlier
mode of unified existence. Before Freud calls to his aid the poet-philosopher’s myth, he first
discusses a set of “experiments on protista” which demonstrate the process of “conjugation” after
cellular division. These experiments provide us with a model for how reproduction functioned
before multicellular organisms enter the scene. The experiments on protista that Freud describes
show the way in which conjugation has a “strengthening and rejuvenating” effect [stärkend und
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verjüngend].62 This effect goes beyond mere conservation. The self-preservative drives not only
prevent improper ends or short-circuited deaths, they also renew life itself. The life drive gives some
poor soul a drink to make him young again.63
What is at stake with the life drives and the death drives is not progression and
conservation—we have already established the fact that these two modes are not mutually exclusive.
What differentiates these drives, on the contrary, is the principle of union versus the principle of
destruction. The Aristophanes myth shows us the act of restoring union, which Freud describes as
the aim of Eros. Because Freud clearly tells us that his new theory is dualistic, we are compelled to
believe that there are also a set of “destructive instincts” [Destructionstriebe] that aim to break bonds
and annihilate all existing unities. In Freud’s final binary, the death drive takes over as the “primal,”
“daemonic” force which strives to destroy and disintegrate existing bonds, while sexuality goes over
to the side of the binding process.64
Freud’s final theory of the drives is both dualistic and dynamic. Freud is not concerned with
isolating the drives, as he explicitly writes in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety: “What we are
concerned with are scarcely ever pure instinctual impulses but mixtures in various proportions of the
two groups of [drives].”65 In The Ego and the Id, Freud writes that the death drive is impossible to see
except when it combines with Eros: it “eludes our perception… unless it is tinged with eroticism.”66
The two drives—the life drive (or Eros) and the death drive—sometimes hide each other and render
the other theoretically inaccessible. Sometimes the death drive exists in a form that is so destructive
to the mental apparatus that all forms of unity and all forms of love are impossible. Sometimes Eros

Ibid., 66; 59.
Just as the Old Peasant and the Witch give Faust a drink in Goethe’s Faust. See page 50.
64 J. LaPlanche and J.-B. Pontalis, 99-100.
65 See Freud Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 125.
66 “Da wir aber dazu genötigt sind, müssen wir den Eindruck gewinnen, daß die Todestriebe im wesentlichen stumm sind und der
Lärm des Lebens meist vom Eros ausgeht Nach unserer Auffassung sind ja die nach außen gerichteten Destruktionstriebe durch Vermittlung
des Eros vom eigenen Selbst abgelenkt worden.” See Freud, The Ego and the Id (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1960),
121-22.
62
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dominates mental life so intensely that all hints of destruction—all analyses—appear only to aid an
eventual synthesis. Whether it is, in the end, destruction that serves to provide the materials for
binding to take place, or binding that sets the groundwork for eventual destruction, still resists
understanding. The drives will not be pulled apart. They are bound up with each other and they
operate only in tandem, not unlike Aristophanes’s multi-limbed creature.
In sum, when we think about death as something occurring before life, we recognize the
event of death-after-life as a repetition. This discovery is also crucial in understanding the movement
of Freud’s drives over the course of our lives. The drives conserve and progress, they move us
onwards, and yet they regress. The drives can synthesize matter and analyze matter, bind lovers
together and pull them apart. The drives may hide each other, but it is precisely in their interplay
that they reveal each other. These contradictions must not be interpreted as a theoretical dilemma;
on the contrary, the only way to engage with the logic of the drives is to understand their movement
dialectically. To learn more about the dialectic at play in the drives, I will discuss the way that death,
always tinged with eroticism, operates within life.

Death Within Life: Repetition
In the previous section, I established how death as an event after life can be observed as a
repetition of death-before-life, since death has actually already taken place. I discussed the idea of a
death-before-life in Freud’s presentation of the drives, which are at work in the primary process that
comes before the pleasure principle enters the scene. The death drive works in tandem with the
erotic drive over the course of life, and the work of the drives is the motor behind the specific
course of a particular life. Thus, death is not only a singular event but also a drive that is at work in
all the little repetitions that occur during life. These many repetitions throughout life hold the basic
structure of death, as both origin and end. I have established in the previous sections that the death
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drive, as repetition, has a circular structure. We can see this idea in its inverse, too: every repetition
within life reminds us of the structure of death. In this section, I will discuss the way that death may
be situated within life in the form of repetition.
Over the course of life, everyone—even the self-proclaimed “healthy” individual—is sure to
encounter many repetitions; many things seem to return constantly in our lives. For instance, when
it seems like every time I look at the clock it says 11:11, I might claim: “This has happened ten… or
could it be eleven… days in a row!” What is the universe trying to tell me? In active situations, when
the subject has chosen their own fate, the return of the same seems relatively non-threatening. In
passive situations, however, the continuous return of the same seems alarming and uncanny—
perhaps even daemonic.
To describe the “perpetual recurrence of the same thing,” [ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen] Freud
uses an example from literature.67 68 He recounts a story written by Torquado Tasso in Gerusalemma
Liberata, wherein the hero Tancred accidently kills his beloved Clorinda when she is disguised as the
enemy.69 After Tancred buries Clorinda, he goes through a magic forest and slashes a tree that
appears to be threatening him, but the tree turns out to be holding Clorinda’s soul prisoner, and the
bleeding tree speaks in Clorinda’s voice. Unbeknownst to him, Tancred has killed Clorinda twice; he
repeated the murder “unwittingly” [unwissentlich].70 Freud also includes a clinical example when he
recalls the “woman who married three successive husbands, each of whom fell ill soon afterwards
and had to be nursed by her on their death-beds” [Man denke zum Beispiel an die Geschichte jener Frau,
die dreimal nacheinander Männer heiratete, die nach kurzer Zeit erkrankten und von ihr zu Tode gepflegt werden

Freud, BPP 23; JL 21.
Freud might have borrowed this phrase from Nietzsche – Nietzsche’s “eternal return of the same” or
“eternal recurrence” which appears for the first time in The Gay Science [Die fröhliche Wissenschaft].
69 Goethe also composed a play that follows the legend of Torquado Tasso.
70 Freud 24; 21.
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mußten].71 Both Tasso’s Tancred and this perpetual widow find themselves repeating the most
upsetting moments of their lives, and their repetitions have a certain air of fate about them.
Together, these two cases lead Freud to his claim: “If we take into account observations such as
these, based upon behavior in the transference and upon the life-histories of men and women, we
shall find courage to assume that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which
overrides the pleasure principle” [Angesichts solcher Beobachtungen aus dem Verhalten in der Übertragung und
aus dem Schicksal der Menschen werden wir den Mut zur Annahme finden, daß es im Seelenleben wirklich einen
Wiederholungszwang gibt, der sich über das Lustprinzip hinaussetzt].72 Just as soon as Freud names the
repetition compulsion as such, though, he pulls it back. He writes that it is only in “rare instances”
[in seltenen Fällen] that the repetition compulsion can be observed “in pure effects.”73 But just as
quickly as he pulls it back, Freud throws the language of the repetition compulsion back into the
argument: “Enough is left unexplained to justify the hypothesis of a compulsion to repeat—
something that seems more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual that the pleasure principle
which it over-rides” [Es bleibt genug übrig, was die Annahme des Wiederholungszwanges rechtfertigt, und dieser
erscheint uns ursprünglicher, elementarer, triebhafter als das von ihm zur Seite geschobene Lustprinzip].74 Perhaps
the difficulty of recognizing the repetition compulsion in the larger theoretical schema that Freud is
laying (or maybe playing) out is due to Freud’s undying attachment to the pleasure principle.
Even though the compulsion to repeat is psychically primary to (i.e. more primitive than) the
pleasure principle, Freud has not altogether abandoned the language of the previously theorized
pleasure principle. Freud writes:
But if a compulsion to repeat does operate in the mind, we should be glad to know
something about it, to learn what function it corresponds to, under what conditions
it can emerge and what its relation is to the pleasure principle—to which, after all, we
Ibid.
Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 25; 22.
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have hitherto ascribed dominance over the course of the processes of excitation in
mental life.
Es bleibt genug übrig, was die Annahme des Wiederholungszwanges rechtfertigt, und dieser erscheint
uns ursprünglicher, elementarer, triebhafter als das von ihm zur Seite geschobene Lustprinzip.
Wenn es aber einen solchen Wiederholungszwang im Seelischen gibt, so möchten wir gerne etwas
darüber wissen, welcher Funktion er entspricht, unter welchen Bedingungen er hervortreten kann,
und in welcher Beziehung er zum Lustprinzip steht, dem wir doch bisher die Herrschaft über den
Ablauf der Erregungsvorgänge im Seelenleben zugetraut haben.75
Freud is developing his idea of repetition, which seems to work against the grain of the pleasure
principle, while still seeming to remain tied to the primacy of the pleasure principle as such. In
continuing his search for the connection between the pleasure principle and the compulsion to
repeat, Freud himself seems reluctant to move totally “beyond” [jenseits] his prior theory. He
introduces the idea of the repetition compulsion into his discourse, retracts it, and reintroduces it.
What kind of game is Freud playing?
It is called the “Fort! Da!” game! Freud’s encounter with this game occurred while he was
living with some mysterious child “under the same roof… for some weeks” [ich lebte durch einige
Wochen mit dem Kinde und dessen Eltern unter einem Dach].76 77 In the following, Freud writes about “the
first game played by a little boy of one and a half… invented by himself” [das erste selbstgeschaffene Spiel
eines Knaben im Alter von 1/2 Jahren].78 I have reproduced Freud’s entire Fort! Da! game description
here to aid my close reading of this embedded text. It will become clear after examining this child’s
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The most personal comment Freud makes about the little boy is made in a footnote: Freud says: “When the
child was five and three-quarters, his mother died. Now that she was really ‘gone’ (‘o-o-o’), the little boy showed no signs
of grief. It is true that in the interval a second child had been born and had roused him to violent jealousy” [Als das Kind
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game that Freud’s own theorizing repeats the Fort! Da! dynamic that he describes in this anecdote.
Freud writes:
The child was not at all precocious in his intellectual development. At the age of one
and a half he could say only a few comprehensible words; he could also make use of
a number of sounds which expressed a meaning intelligible to those around him. He
was, however, on good terms with his parents and their one servant girl, and tributes
were paid to his being a ‘good boy’. He did not disturb his parents at night, he
conscientiously obeyed orders not to touch certain things or go into certain rooms,
and above all he never cried when his mother left him for a few hours. At the same
time, he was greatly attached to his mother, who had not fed him herself but had
also looked after him without any outside help. This good little boy, however, had an
occasional disturbing habit of taking any small objects he could get hold of and
throwing them away from him into a corner, under the bed, and so on, so that
hunting for his toys and picking them up was often quite a business. As he did this
he gave vent to a loud, long-drawn-out ‘o-o-o-o’, accompanied by an expression of
interest and satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the present account were
agreed in thinking that this was not a mere interjection but represented the German
word ‘fort’ [‘gone’]. I eventually realized that it was a game and that the only use he
made of any of his toys was to play ‘gone’ with them. One day I made an
observation which confirmed my view. The child had a wooden reel with a piece of
string tied round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him,
for instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to hold the reel by the
string and very skillfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it
disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his expressive ‘o-o-o-o’. He then pulled
the reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful ‘da’
[‘there’]. This, then, was the complete game—disappearance and return. As a rule,
one only witnessed its first act, which was repeated untiringly as a game in itself,
though there is no doubt that the greater pleasure was attached to the second act.
Das Kind war in seiner intellektuellen Entwicklung keineswegs voreilig, es sprach mit 1 ½ Jahren
erst wenige verständliche Worte und verfügte außerdem über mehrere bedeutungsvolle Laute, die von
der Umgebung verstanden wurden. Aber es war in gutem Rapport mit den Eltern und dem einzigen
Dienstmädchen und wurde wegen seines „anständigen" Charakters gelobt. Es störte die Eltern nicht
zur Nachtzeit, befolgte gewissenhaft die Verbote, manche Gegenstände zu berühren und in gewisse
Räume zu gehen, und vor allem anderen, es weinte nie, wenn die Mutter es für Stunden verließ,
obwohl es dieser Mutter zärtlich anhing, die das Kind nicht nur selbst genährt, sondern auch ohne
jede fremde Beihilfe gepflegt und betreut hatte. Dieses brave Kind zeigte nun die gelegentlich störende
Gewohnheit, alle kleinen Gegenstände, deren es habhaft wurde, weit weg von sich in eine
Zimmerecke, unter ein Bett usw. zu schleudern, so daß das Zusammensuchen seines Spielzeuges oft
keine leichte Arbeit war. Dabei brachte es mit dem Ausdruck von Interesse und Befriedigung ein
lautes, langgezogenes o—o—o—o hervor, das nach dem übereinstimmenden Urteil der Mutter und
des Beobachters keine Interjektion war, sondern „Fort" bedeutete. Ich merkte endlich, daß das ein
Spiel sei, und daß das Kind alle seine Spielsachen nur dazu benütze, mit ihnen „fortsein" zu
spielen. Eines Tages machte ich dann die Beobachtung, die meine Auffassung bestätigte. Das Kind
hatte eine Holzspule, die mit einem Bindfaden umwickelt war. Es fiel ihm nie ein, sie zum Beispiel
am Boden hinter sich herzuziehen, also Wagen mit ihr zu spielen, sondern es warf die am Faden
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gehaltene Spule mit großem Geschick über den Rand seines verhängten Bettchens, so daß sie darin
verschwand, sagte dazu sein bedeutungsvolles o—o—o—o und zog dann die Spule am Faden
wieder aus dem Bett heraus, begrüßte aber deren Erscheinen jetzt mit einem freudigen „Da". Das
war also das komplette Spiel, Verschwinden und Wiederkommen, wovon man zumeist nur den
ersten Akt zu sehen bekam, und dieser wurde für sich allein unermüdlich als Spiel wiederholt,
obwohl die größere Lust unzweifelhaft dem zweiten Akt anhing.79
This is the game [das Spiel] that the unnamed child plays: he throws a string away and then pulls it
back. It goes away, it disappears, f-o-o-o-o-r-t, and then it comes back, it reappears da. The game is
repeated over and over again. It is “complete,” and the child can perform this game himself. Freud
tells us a little about the child who conducts this enigmatic ceremony, as well.80 First, the child is
“not at all precocious in his intellectual development” [war in seiner intellektuellen Entwicklung keineswegs
voreilig]; he is not a particularly smart kid and he knows only a few words. The child is, however,
obedient, well-behaved, undramatic. He did not protest when his parents left, even though he was
“greatly attached to his mother” [obwohl es dieser Mutter zärtlich anhing]. But in the game, there are some
remnants of the parents who have gone fort!
Let us trace the trajectory of Freud’s analysis of this encounter with the child. The “obvious”
analysis, according to Freud, interprets the repetition in this game as an effect of the repressed
renunciation of the satisfaction of the drives. This interpretation sees the game as evidence of
“[drive] renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in
allowing his mother to go away without protesting)” [Triebverzicht (Verzicht auf Triebbefriedigung), das
Fortgehen der Mutter ohne Sträuben zu gestatten].81 The drives have been abandoned, but their traces that
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evade repression are repeated. With this interpretation, Freud claims that there is “no doubt” [kein
Zweifel] that the second act, “da!,” is attached to “greater pleasure” [die größere Lust].82 According to
this interpretation, the game expresses instinctual satisfaction that has been renounced, repressed,
but still nonetheless remains da! The language of repression detains us in the territory of the pleasure
principle. The goal of the pleasure principle is to reach the level of zero-excitation, and it seems that
the game helps to accomplish this. Freud hypothesizes first that “It may perhaps be said in reply that
her departure had to be enacted as a necessary preliminary to her joyful return, and that it was in the
latter that lay the true purpose of the game” [Man wird vielleicht antworten wollen, das Fortgehen müßte als
Vorbedingung des erfreulichen Wiedererscheinens gespielt werden, im letzteren sei die eigentliche Spielabsicht gelegen].83
According to this reasoning, even if some behavior seems to operate against pleasure of one kind, it
is still ruled by pleasure of another kind; “pleasure,” therefore, is still the aim of the game. But Freud
quickly pulls this idea back. This hypothesis cannot be maintained because the child repeats the
“fort!” far more frequently than the “da!” Freud writes about that “the first act, that of departure, was
staged as a game in itself and far more frequently than the episode in its entirety, with its pleasurable
ending” [Dem würde die Beobachtung widersprechen, daß der erste Akt, das Fortgehen, für sich allein als Spiel
inszeniert wurde, und zwar ungleich häufiger als das zum lustvollen Ende fortgeführte Ganze].84 This does not
necessarily mean that the “greater pleasure” is actually tied up with the “fort!,” though. Perhaps there
is some other influence to be accounted for.
Freud proposes that this other motive at work generates pleasure out of the conversion of
passivity into activity; he calls it the “drive for mastery” [Bemächtigungstrieb].85 86 He postulates that the
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child’s repetitive game functions in order to bind the traumatic memory of the leaving parents and
the energy that is used in the child’s libidinal connection to the parents. Only when this energy is
bound up with the trauma can the child master his trauma. For Freud, the instinct to master is
usually considered asexual, independent of sexual pleasure, and it is often “acting independently of
whether the memory was in itself pleasurable or not” [der sich davon unabhängig macht, ob die Erinnerung
an sich lustvoll war oder nicht].87 88 But Freud is not yet ready to separate the instinct for mastery from
the pleasure principle. He adds one more detail to his interpretation: the boy’s game of mastery
might work like revenge, as if he were to say “All right, then, go away! I don’t need you. I’m sending
you away myself” [Ja, geh' nur fort, ich brauch' dich nicht, ich schick' dich selber weg].89 To support this
interpretation, Freud found out a year later that this boy was observed saying “Go to the front!”
[Geh' in K(r)ieg!] while playing on the floor (in reference to his father, who was fighting at the front).90
This line of thinking on the drive to mastery is supported by previous theory: by both the Oedipus
Complex, in which it makes sense that a young boy would unconsciously wish for his father to leave
him with complete access to the mother, and by clinical experience with children that shows their
tendency to discard “objects instead of persons” [Wir wissen auch von anderen Kindern, daß sie ähnliche
feindselige Regungen durch das Wegschleudern von Gegenständen an Stelle der Personen auszudrücken vermögen]. 91 92
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However, Freud is “left in doubt” [in Zweifel] about whether or not the present inquiry is
indeed associated with the pleasure principle as he had hitherto defined it.93 He wonders if “the
repetition carried along with it a yield of pleasure of another sort” [der Lustgewinn aus anderer Quelle],
i.e. a form of pleasure that could not be felt as such due to the work of repression.94 But then again,
Freud seems quite comfortable in the language of the pleasure principle while examining the Fort!
Da! game. He even leads himself back into the language of wish-fulfillment, the theory from The
Interpretation of Dreams most tied to the pleasure principle, when he writes “it is obvious that all their
play is influenced by a wish that dominates them the whole time—the wish to be grown up” [Aber
anderseits ist es klar genug, daß all ihr Spielen unter dem Einflüsse des Wunsches steht, der diese ihre Zeit dominiert,
des Wunsches: groß zu sein]. Ultimately, though, at the end of Chapter II, Freud clears away all previous
doubts about the relationship between the game and the pleasure principle:
The consideration of these cases, which have a yield of pleasure as their final
outcome, should be undertaken by some system of aesthetics with an economic
approach to its subjective matter. They are of no use for our purposes, since they
presuppose the existence and dominance of the pleasure principle; they give no
evidence of the operation of tendencies beyond the pleasure principle, that is, of
tendencies more primitive than it and independent of it.
Mag sich mit diesen, in endlichen Lustgewinn auslaufenden Fällen und Situationen eine ökonomisch
gerichtete Ästhetik befassen für unsere Absichten leisten sie nichts, denn sie setzen Existenz und
Herrschaft des Lustprinzips voraus und zeugen nicht für die Wirksamkeit von Tendenzen jenseits
des Lustprinzips, das heißt solcher, die ursprünglicher als dies und von ihm unabhängig wären.95
Why was the process that led up to this conclusion so zigzagged? There is something about pleasure
and unpleasure that seems difficult for Freud to pin down or master. He throws out the possibility
that there is something “beyond” the pleasure principle just as the child throws the wooden reel, but
then pulls back the idea that has been “da!” in his mind all along. The crucial aspect of Freud’s
theoretical dilemma is that it rests on the idea of repetition. Repetition can be both pleasurable and
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frightful. Neurotics worry themselves with repetition, children use repetition like a toy and a tool,
and repeated events sometimes haunt literary figures like some malign fate.
Why is Freud inserting himself into the game of the child? The first time Freud attempts to
thoughtfully intrude on the child’s game, he is rejected. Freud intrudes onto the Fort! Da! game with
his own play-idea—the wooden reel could be “pull[ed] along the floor behind him, for instance, and
[he could] play at its being a carriage.”96 But neither he nor his idea is necessary; the child is complete
in his game in the way that he imagined it. Freud’s second intrusion into the game, however, is
mimetic. Freud absorbs the Fort! Da! movement into his own theoretical logic; he throws the
pleasure principle fort! and then brings it da! (which means in German both “here” and “therefore”)
in the conclusion.
Freud’s various interpretational moves in the course of his examination of the “Fort! Da!”
game might be helpful as we try to understand how Freud attempts to move beyond the pleasure
principle and into a theory of the drives and repetition. It is quite possible, for example, that he is
seeking—ultimately in vain—a release from the excitation the observation caused him. Or is he
trying to master something, and if so, what? Is there a latent content here behind the manifest
content? To help understand what it is about the pleasure principle that generates so much
ambivalence over the course of Freud’s examination, it is useful to note a crucial elision (or navel) in
the text. The unnamed child is Freud’s grandson Ernst, the son of his daughter Sophie who died
during the Spanish Flu outbreak of 1918. Freud wrote half of Beyond the Pleasure Principle while Sophie
was alive and half after she had died. When we ask, “What is this theoretical Fort! Da! game
mastering?” one answer might be “the death of Sophie.” Freud omits her name, killing her and
sending her “fort!” on the narrative level. Franz Wittels reads the text as evidence of Freud’s inability
to mourn Sophie’s death; he went so far as to say that Freud’s theory of the death drive is a
96
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symptom of the grief that Freud experienced upon Sophie’s death.97 Freud took care to defend
himself against possible critiques that involve his daughter. He wrote to Eitingon: “The Beyond is
finally finished. You will be able to confirm that it was half finished when Sophie was alive and full
of health.”98 But what an odd kernel of self-defense this is. Freud remains totally vulnerable to Karl
Kraus’s famous criticism: “Psychoanalysis is the mental illness for which it claims to be a cure.”99 Or
alternatively, the text where Freud claims to theorize death in a new way only functions in order to
postpone or evade mourning a death which Freud experienced in real life.100 But we must remain
nonetheless wary of the effect of such readings—they have the potential to bring our inquiry to an
improper end. This conclusion cannot be our ending point, because it will never be anything more
than speculation.
When Beyond the Pleasure Principle was published, Freud’s colleague Ernest Jones began
distancing himself from Freud. He claimed that Freud had always suffered from anxiety about death,
both his own death and the deaths of loved ones. According to Jones, Freud was almost phobic of
the idea of bodily deterioration and old age.101 Jacques Derrida, in his text The Postcard, went so far as
to say that Freud’s theoretical Fort! Da! game served as Freud’s way to “send [himself] a message of
[his] own death.”102 We must not abandon our investigation for a simple autobiographical totalizing
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explanation that has the function of dissolving all of the important incongruities of the text. The
question of Freud’s possible inability to mourn the death of his daughter Sophie will remain open.
This autobiographical information shows us that, while covering up the death of his own child,
Freud tells us a story about repetition in his grandson’s game. This emphasis on repetition is what
drives us forward in our present inquiry on death. After Freud moves through his discussion of Fort!
Da!, we are left to wonder if this child’s repetition has something to do with a death drive that exists
beyond the pleasure principle, but Freud tells us that the game “gives no evidence of the operation
beyond the pleasure principle, that is of tendencies more primitive than it and independent of it.”103
In this passage, Freud leaves us in the dark about the relation between the repetition compulsion
and the death drive. But this darkness is precisely where the repetition compulsion dwells: “beyond”
the rational binary of pleasure and unpleasure, or pleasure and reality, that Freud has trouble letting
go of.

Repetition has consistently been a problem in psychoanalysis on the practical level. The
analyst aims to help the patient uncover and remember their repressed material and weaken their
resistance to treatment. In psychoanalytic treatment, uncovering the repressed material means
loosening the repression and the resistance. A common misunderstanding insists that there is an
unconscious entity doing the repressing, but repression is actually directed by the ego, which is both
conscious and unconscious.104 In repression, the unconscious material is pressing ever forward
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[(dringt) immer vorwärts] into consciousness. The repressed material must then become conscious for
the symptom to be revealed and for its power to be diminished. While the resurfacing of repressed
material will surely be unpleasurable—the repression and the resistance both exist under the
dominion of the pleasure principle—one can imagine that pleasure will ultimately result from the
reduced power of the repressed. But the cases of patients coming to the clinic after fighting in
World War I demonstrate the fact that un-pleasurable moments of trauma can repeat uncontrollably.
These patients who suffer from traumatic neurosis experience dreams that “have the characteristic
of repeatedly bringing the patient back into the situation of his accident, a situation where he wakes
up in another fright” [den Charakter, daß es den Kranken immer wieder in die Situation seines Unfalles
zurückführt, aus der er mit neuem Schrecken erwacht].105 We recall that Freud previously defines “fright” as
“the state a person gets into when he has run into danger without being prepared for it; it
emphasizes the factor of surprise” [Schreck aber benennt den Zustand, in den man gerät, wenn man in Gefahr
kommt, ohne auf sie vorbereitet zu sein, betont das Moment der Überraschung].106 Although the patients who
come into the clinic seem to be more consciously consumed by the activity of forgetting their
accident than fixating their thoughts on it, their symptoms imply a certain fixation of psychical
energy on a traumatic moment from the past. The analyst, then, aims to help the analysand
recognize their repetition as pertaining to some traumatic moment from the past.107 Although Freud
does not consider the repetitions of the Fort! Da! game to be identical to the dreams of neurotics
coming back from war, both instances share the repetitive structure. In these cases, repression, a key
element of the pleasure principle, does not appear to be working on the material which is being
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repeated. Why is this? We must deduce that the repetition compulsion is capable of overthrowing
the pleasure principle and repression alike. But does this capability necessarily situate the repetition
compulsion beyond?
Freud is stuck between two claims: first, that the repetition compulsion is a manifestation of
repression (in the realm of the pleasure principle) and second, that the repetition compulsion
thwarts repression and is independent of the pleasure principle. What is it in the repetition
compulsion that points us to something beyond the pleasure principle? Samuel Weber, in The Legend of
Freud, writes: “Freud never appears to have recognized, much less reflected upon, the problems
raised by his description of the repetition compulsion as a manifestation of repression, on the one
hand, and as being independent of the pleasure principle, on the other.”108 The most interesting part
of this dilemma we find ourselves in is the fact that Freud, as he theorizes a form of death which
occurs within life, is studying repetition. For Freud, death-within-life is a repetitive process; similarly,
the phenomenon of repetition within life is linked with death. But Weber remarks that “in order to
conceptualize the notion of binding, Freud cannot avoid resorting to that of repetition: as a temporal
process, binding is inconceivable except as a form of repetition,” thus highlighting the relationship
between repetition and binding, which Freud associates with Eros.109 Freud describes the birth of
the erotic drive using the myth of Aristophanes, which I discussed in the “Before” section. But
when Freud attempts to theorize the idea of binding, he defines it using the concept of repetition.
Gilles Deleuze describes the relationship between binding and Eros as working according to the
structural condition of unity.110 The binding in sexual union that occurs when the androgynous being
is united with its missing part is unthinkable except as a form of repetition of an earlier state of
things. But if we understand this quality of repetition “to bind” psychic energy, just like the pleasure
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principle binds excitation to return the organism to a level of zero-excitation, then how is it possible
that repetition also forces Freud beyond the pleasure principle? Repetition, although it is not itself
beyond the pleasure principle, drives Freud beyond the pleasure principle, because it does not lead
to any pleasurable conclusion. Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, rather than leading to a new
ground [Grund] leads us, after a series of theoretical detours, to an abyss [Abgrund], a complete
absence of ground.
For now, though, I will leave what is beyond behind. What is important for my inquiry is the
idea that when Freud theorizes about the death drive, he cannot avoid the phenomenon of
repetition, and when Freud theorizes repetition, he cannot escape death. As my analysis of Freud
makes clear, we encounter death repeatedly within our lives – when we mourn, when our cells
conjugate and divide, when we experience repetition. Death is not just some state from before life,
or some looming future after life; it is something we encounter within our lives repeatedly. The
repetition compulsion, understood in this way, may not be itself, in the end, beyond the pleasure
principle. The repetition compulsion does, however, indicate that the pleasure principle is not the
only process governing our psychic lives. Repetition is bound up somewhere between the death
drive, which destroys and analyzes all existing bonds, and Eros, which forges bonds and synthesizes.
Sometimes repetition works on behalf of death and love simultaneously. Its position is paradoxical.
Perhaps Freud did not make it all the way beyond the pleasure principle. He did, however, show
us that some portion of the beyond can be found in the death which occurred before life and within
life in the form of the death drive and the repetition compulsion. In this text, Freud also leaves us a
clue as to where to look next in our striving for some kind of beyond: “the poet’s words” or
Goethe’s drama Faust. Indeed, poetry functions as the furthest beyond of Freud’s speculative
project, the frame of Beyond the Pleasure Principle – carrying Freud across moments of theoretical
breakdown or aporia, providing examples where even life provides none, offering an ending where
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Freud is unable to conclude.111 We have followed Freud diligently to see where his speculative line of
thought would lead him, and now we must push ahead just like the drives which, in
Mephistopheles’s (and Goethe’s) words that Freud quotes, are “always pressing forward” [ungebändigt
immer vorwärts dringt].112 Just as Freud finds himself turning to the literary in the moments when
speculation hesitates, so too does my speculative path lead me to the realm of the literary and to
Goethe’s Faust.

111 Instead of a conclusion, Freud points us elsewhere into the world of poetry. After all, the last words of
Beyond the Pleasure principle are, indeed, the words of the poet Al-Hariri via Friedrich Rückert (see footnote 2). The idea is
that “What we cannot reach flying we must reach limping… The Book tells us it is no sin to limp.” Goethe’s
Mephistopheles limps too: In “Auerbach’s Wine-Cellar in Leipzig, Siebel asks “Why does the fellow limp with that one
foot?” [Was hinkt der Kerl auf Einem Fuß?]. Goethe, Faust, 2184. Like the limping devil, therefore, we move forward with
our inquiry on death slowly. After all, it is no sin.
112 Freud 51; 45.
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The Force of Blood in Goethe’s Faust 113

Illness was near. Already possessed by shadows,
the blood flowed darkly; yet, though for a moment suspicious,
it swells out into its natural springtime.
Again and again interrupted by darkness and downfall,
It gleamed earthly. Until, after terrible pounding,
it walked through the inconsolably open door.114
Nah war die Krankheit. Schon von den Schatten bemächtigt,
drängte verdunkelt das Blut, doch, wie flüchtig verdächtigt,
trieb es in seinen natürlichen Frühling hervor.
Wieder und wieder, von Dunkel und Stürz unterbrochen,
glänzte es irdisch. Bis es nach schrecklichem Pochen
trat in das trostlos offene Tor.
In this book every word has been lived, profoundly and intimately; the most painful things are not lacking in it; it
contains words which are positively running with blood.
Hier ist jedes Wort erlebt, tief, innerlich; es fehlt nicht am Schmerzlichsten, es sind Worte darin, die geradezu blutrünstig sind.115

Over the course of his exploration of the death drive, Freud chooses Goethe’s Faust as his
interlocutor and inspiration. This turning to Faust is not specific to Beyond the Pleasure Principle; indeed
Freud, throughout his oeuvre, can be found quoting Faust in moments of significant theoretical
discovery.116 It is clear in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, too, that Goethe has something to say about
death that Freud can’t quite say himself. Indeed, Faust illuminates, clarifies, and obfuscates death for
Freud. In this chapter, I shall turn to Goethe’s drama and ask: how does Goethe think death in
Faust? And how might Goethe’s Faust inform our thinking on death more broadly?
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appears in Freud’s work in her Dictations: On Haunted Writing (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 4.
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There are several entry points to an inquiry on the question of death in Faust: Faust’s initial
thoughts on suicide when he contemplates drinking poison from a vial; the figure of
Mephistopheles, who claims to be “the spirit which always negates [der Geist der stehts verneint]; and the
question of whether or not Faust dies at the end of the drama. 117 While none of these entry points
alone can answer the question of the meaning of death in the play, together they raise the broader
question of how death drives the action, motivates it, and draws it onward. In this respect, it seems
that death courses through the veins of Goethe’s Faust like blood. In the following, I will closely
examine the language of blood in the play, returning at the end of the chapter to the broader
dynamics of death in Faust. My claim is that Faust presents us with a way of thinking death
dialectically: neither as an annihilation nor as a supersession of life, but as something circulating
through one’s own body that must be encountered repetitively so long as one lives.

Tödliche Kräfte
At the beginning of the tragedy, Faust finds himself drawn to a liquid substance that
threatens to bring him and his story to a premature end. This liquid is contained in a vial, shaped
like a skull, sitting on the shelf. Faust meets the vial, and he addresses it:
But what is there that holds my gaze—
does that vial act as a magnet on the eye?
Why do I sense a sudden gentle brightness,
As what in some dark forest moonlight stirs about us?
I greet you, vial of vials! With reverence
I take you down—my homage to
the human wit and skill embodied in you.
You essence of soporific forces,
you extract of all subtle poisons,
bestow your favors on your master!
117 Goethe, Faust, 1338. Translation modified. I should note that I will be focusing primarily on Faust I,
published in 1808, but especially in my section on endings, I will also account for Faust II, published after Goethe’s death
in 1832.
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I see you, and my pain is eased,
I hold you, and my striving lessens—
my turbulence of spirit slowly ebbs away.
I am transported to the open sea,
its surface sparkles down below,
and a new day beckons to new shores.
Doch warum heftet sich mein Blick auf jene Stelle?
Ist jenes Fläschchen dort Augen ein Magnet?
Warum wird mir auf einmal lieblich helle,
Als wenn im nächt’gen Wald uns Mondenglanz umweht?
Ich grüße dich, du einzige Phiole!
Die ich mit Andacht nun herunterhole,
In dir verehr’ ich Menschenwitz und Kunst.
Du Inbegriff der holden Schlummersäfte,
Der Auszug aller tödlich feinen Kräfte,
Erweise deinem Meister deine Gunst!
Ich sehe dich, es wird der Schmerz gelindert,
Ich fasse dich, das Streben wird gemindert,
Des Geistes Flutstrom ebbet nach und nach.
In’s hohe Meer werd’ ich hinausgewiesen,
Die Spiegelflut erglänzt zu meinen Füßen,
Zu neuen Ufern lockt ein neuer Tag.118
The “vial of vials” contains a set of “subtle forces” [feine Kräfte] that act in “deadly” [tödlich] ways.119
The German word “Kraft,” like the English word “craft,” which can be defined as “the strength and
skill in our hands,” was originally associated with the clenching of the muscle.120 There is a special
commingling of force and body in both the English and the German words, and this is also the case
with the liquid substance in the vial. The Kräfte within the vial have the potential to operate on
Faust’s body and thought. The deadly forces within the vial pull Faust in—he says that his gaze is
drawn to the vial, as if by a kind of magnetism. The vial’s forces hold Faust’s eyes and welcome him.

Goethe 686-701.
Ibid., 694.
120 See “Kraft” in dem deutschen Wortschatz von 1600 bis heute (DWDS): “Mit Kraft würde sich dann ursprünglich
die Vorstellung der Muskelanspannung verbinden”: https://www.dwds.de/wb/kraft.
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It casts a “gentle brightness” [helle] or “moonlight” [Mondenglanz] on him. While Faust gestures
toward the vial, it seems like the vial also reaches out toward him. Faust and the vial encounter one
another, and both extend a hand in greeting.121
But what is the effect of this encounter between Faust and the vial, and what exactly
becomes of their meeting face-to-face, hand-in-hand? The deadly vial soothes his body: Faust sees
the vial and his “pain is eased” [es wird der Schmerz gelindert]. When he holds the vial, his “striving
lessens” [das Streben wird gemindert] and the “turbulence of [his] spirit ebbs away” [Des Geistes Flutstrom
ebbet nach und nach].122 In Faust’s contemplation of the vial, its deadly substance functions as an
opposing force to that which is “striving” and “turbulen[t]” within Faust. This opposing force is not
a force of stagnation, though, but one of lightness. There is nothing stagnant about Faust’s vision of
the deadly vial, which has the power to transport him to an “open sea” where he can see the
promise of “a new day” [In’s hohe Meer werd’ ich hinausgewiesen / Die Spiegelflut erglänzt zu meinen Füßen,
/Zu neuen Ufern lockt ein neuer Tag].123 Faust’s death is certainly at stake in his meditation on the vial.
But the death that he thinks is not a fixed end; rather, the death that the liquid offers is light, open,
and quiet. He imagines there is something about these deadly forces that is glimmering and
transporting. What is deadly here has the potential to carry Faust to a new state of being.124
As Faust gazes at the vial, he is thinking about his own death. It becomes clear that Faust
imagines that the deadly force of the vial will on the one hand, counter his striving, and on the other
hand, power him onward toward the new day. Faust imagines death as an absence of turbulence and
a cessation of forward momentum, but with a new day ahead. At the same time, though, Faust is

In German, the language of the hand is within Faust’s name: “die Faust” means “the fist.”
Goethe 697-701.
123 Goethe 699-701.
124 In his contemplation on the vial, Faust reveals something of a desire-toward-death. Faust’s fantasy of the
“tödliche Kräfte” within the vial provides a promising analogy for Freud’s Todestrieb. In the same way that Freud’s death
drive does not necessarily entail “a wish for death,” it becomes clear Faust’s thoughts of suicide are not thoughts about
death itself, but rather thoughts about driving toward a new state of quietude and serenity.
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drawing toward this fantasy of a serene death; this fantasy for ultimate quietude becomes part of
Faust’s striving. At this point in the play, though, Faust has not located the forces that strive on
within his own body, and he has not discovered the force of blood.

Töne und Tränen
When Faust touches his lips to the vial, he moves one step closer to discovering the forces that
work within his body. Before that, though, transcendent forces intervene. Like a princess saved by a
prince’s kiss, Faust is saved from the vial’s forces by song just as he kisses the vial: church bells ring
and the Angels’ chorus sings “Christ is arisen! / Joy to the mortal / freed from the baneful, /
insidious ills / that man is heir to” [Christ ist erstanden! / Freude dem Sterblichen, / Den die verderblichen, /
Schleichenden, erblichen / Mängel umwanden].125 The touch of the vial initiates the song at the very
moment that it grazes Faust’s lips.126 Both the vial and the chorus extend toward Faust, but they do
so in different ways. The chorus does not act on his body in the same way that the vial did; it is one
step removed. But Faust feels that the chorus is extending itself toward him, albeit more abstractly:
“Celestial tones, so gently strong, / why do you seek me here amid the dust?” [Was sucht ihr, mächtig
und gelind, / Ihr Himmelstöne, mich am Staube?].127 The song of the chorus does not interact with Faust’s
body in the same way that the vial did; it does not hold or pull him, and it does not welcome or
receive him either. Rather than exerting an impersonal, magnetic force like the vial, the chorus acts
as an agent actively seeking Faust out. If the vial and Faust’s body are drawn to touch each other, the
chorus seems to want to intervene to prevent this communion. But far from diverting Faust from a

Goethe 737-741.
Like Freud’s self-preservative drive, this song rescues Faust from a premature end, or in Freud’s words, a
death that is not his own. Or perhaps the chorus is only protecting Faust’s ability to die “in his own fashion” [auf seine
Weise]. Freud, BPP 47; JL 41.
127 Goethe 762-3.
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physically-driven path, the chorus’s song ultimately carries Faust one step closer toward discovering
the forces at work within his body. This happens via Faust’s memory.
In Greek, memory is embodied in the mythological Titaness Mnemosyne, the daughter of
Heaven and Earth and the bride of Zeus. In nine nights, she bears the nine Muses.128 Memory
functions as a bridge between Heaven and Earth as the source from which poetic waters flow. The
Muses, Music and Poetry, were once together within the womb of Mother Memory.129 Faust’s
memories of childhood are awakened by the Chorus, and the waters that flow from Faust’s
memories take the form of tears: “some strange sweet longing would compel me / to rove through
wood and meadow, / and to a flood of ardent tears / I’d feel a world arise within me” [Ein
unbegreiflich holdes Sehnen / Trieb mich durch Wald und Wiesen hinzugehn, / Und unter tausend heißen Tränen /
Fühlt’ ich mir eine Welt entstehn].130 Faust’s tears of memory nurture an entire world inside him [Fühlt’
ich mir eine Welt entstehn]; 131 it is only when Faust discovers this world within his body that he can
pronounce himself the Earth’s once again [die Erde hat mich wieder!].132 Whereas the vial is an external
force, the song of the chorus functons as a force from within: it inspires an ungraspable [unbegreiflich]
longing operating on him from within, driving [treiben] him on. It is through song, memory, and tears
that Faust is able to feel—and through feeling discover—the forces at work in his body.
But the forces of the vial and the chorus reach toward different goals: while the force within
the vial pushes Faust in the direction of death and the end of his striving, the force of the chorus

128 Martin Heidegger writes in What is Called Thinking?: “Memory, Mother of the Muses—the thinking back to
what is to be thought is the source and ground of poesy. This is why poesy is the water that at times flows backward
toward the source, toward thinking as a thinking back, a recollection” [Gedächtnis: die Mutter der Musen: das Andenken an das
zu-Denkende ist der Quellgrund des Dichtens. Das Dichten ist darum das Gewässer, das bisweilen rückwärts fließt der Quelle zu, zum
Denken als Andenken]. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 11.
129 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 11.
130 Goethe 774-7.
131 Ibid., 777.
132 Ibid., 784.
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drives Faust onward.133 In Faust’s tears, though, he discovers a force within his own body: one that
is both progressive and regressive. Upon his discovery of the force of tears, Faust is pressed
backwards toward memories of his past, but through this regressive motion, he also finds himself
moving towards a new life. The heavenly sounds of the chorus “summon [Faust] now again to life”
[Ruft (der Klang) auch jetzt zurück mich in das Leben]—to a life renewed.134 The operations of this internal
force are difficult to decipher. How can something that is regressive also be progressive and liferenewing?
The process of life-renewal in the case of the vial involves an initial life-annihilation, which
then promises a future affirmation in the form of renewed-life: a life substituted for a new but
changed life in death, depicted as a new day on the distant shore [Zu neuen Ufern lockt ein neuer Tag].135
The life-renewing process that Faust recognizes in the song of the chorus also involves a
substitution: Faust asks if the song of the Angel chorus is a prophecy of a new agreement to bind
the heavenly and earthly spheres [Ihr Chöre singt ihr schon den tröstlichen Gesang / Der einst, um Grabes
Nacht, von Engelslippen klang, / Gewißheit einem neuen Bunde?].136 By asking about a covenant, he takes
one step closer to discovering the forces at work within his own body. Although the chorus does
not answer his call, there is certainly a new covenant to come: the contract between Faust and
Mephistopheles, signed in blood, “a very special juice” [ein ganz besonderer Saft].137

133 It would seem that these opposing forces can serve as useful analogies within the body of the text for
Freud’s life and death drives; over the course of my chapter, though I hope to complicate this initial interpretation.
134 Goethe 770.
135 Ibid., 701.
136 Ibid., 746-8. Just as Jeremia prophesied that there would be a new communion between God and the chosen
people found by Christ based on the older Jewish covenant.
137 Ibid., 1740.
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Excursus on Blood
Blood is a special juice. Like tears, its source is within the body; but unlike
tears, blood is meant to remain inside the body—with the notable exception of
menstruation. When blood is flowing out of the body, there is often something
wrong. Blood has a wealth of symbolic connotations and associations: bloodlines
have been used to signify purity and impurity, in order to justify racist designations.
“The family blood” connotes hereditary relation between family generations. “To
have blood on one’s hands” means to be responsible for someone’s death, and “to
play piano with blood” means to play with passion. It is also important to say that
“blood” can connote both life and death. In the non-metaphorical sense, a woman
bleeds rhythmically at monthly intervals, and her blood can signify either fertility or
non-conception. Perhaps most important is the movement of blood: it pulses
through our body to the repetitive rhythm of a heartbeat. We say that it circulates
within us. Blood exerts a pressure; it can coagulate and clot. Each one of our blood
cells contains our entire genetic code. Blood helps our immune systems fight
diseases, it brings our tissues oxygen so that we can move, and it carries hormones
through our bodies. Blood cells, like all of our cells, die off and replicate themselves
constantly. In Faust, blood carries Faust’s fault and debt [Schuld] when Gretchen feels
it on his hands. Blood is the substance that binds Mephistopheles and Faust
together.138 It courses through the play’s veins and enables Faust’s striving.
Altogether, we notice an intricate array of liquids at work in Goethe’s Faust:
early on, the potion of the vial and the tears of memory. Faust is also later given a
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drink by a peasant who hopes that it will add days to his life and later drinks a
rejuvenating potion from the Witch that makes him young again. And finally, there is
blood, which is both the liquid carrier of death throughout the play and the Kraft that
drives the entire drama onward.

Am Anfang war das Blut
We know that Faust and Mephistopheles end up bound to each other via a contract signed
in blood. But what is at the origin of Faust’s contract with Mephistopheles—when do they meet?
The origin of their contract can be found in the beginning of the scene “Faust’s Study”
[Studierzimmer], when Faust attempts to translate “the holy original” [Das heilige Original] Bible into
German.139 140 While the poodle that he had let into his house barks—a veiled announcement of the
solution to come in the form of Mephistopheles—he opens the book and translates: “In the
beginning was the Word” [Im Anfang war das Wort].141 But Faust is unhappy with this initial effort,
because he cannot concede that words have such a high value [Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich
schätzen].142 He therefore moves through a series of other possibilities: “In the beginning was the
Mind’” [im Anfang war der Sinn], “In the beginning was the Power!’” [im Anfang war die Kraft!], and “In
the beginning was the Act” [im Anfang war die Tat].143 144 Thus, we find ourselves confronted with the

Ibid., 1222.
Here we might notice an echo of Martin Luther. When Luther had been outlawed after his famous defiance
of the emperor Charles V at the Diet of Worms in April 1521, he was imprisoned in the Wartburg, where he began his
translation of the New Testament into German. Tourists are still shown the stain on the wall of his study where,
according to Lutheran lore, he through his inkpot at the devil.
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following chain of signifiers: Word, Mind, Power, and Act. Through this process of translation, the
Word becomes an Act.145
One immediate effect of this displacement of the Word by the Act is the barking of the
poodle Mephistopheles. Once the barking becomes too distracting, Faust must stop translating to
shut it up, using a spell. The poodle propels Faust into action, but the action he takes involves
words, albeit words meant to take on a kind of magical agency. With the aid of Solomon’s Key, “the
Spell of Four,” Faust appeals to the four elements to try to exorcize the poodle, but he finds that the
four elements do not reside in the poodle, and so he must try something stronger. Faust goes on to
use a spell that demands, if the poodle is a “fugitive from Hell” [Ein Flüchtling der Hölle], that it
behold “this Sign” [dies Zeichen].146 On the one hand, it would appear that words still hold some
power, since the spell asks that the creature from Hell “read” the sign [Kannst du ihn lesen].147 But on
the other hand, language is becoming diffuse. In the place of a name, the spell provides only a
description, calling its addressee: “Him that was never create, / Him whose name must not be
spoken, / Who pervades the universe, / though transpierced by lance accursed” [Den nie entspross’nen,
/ Unausgesprochnen, / Durch alle Himmel gegossnen, / Freventlich durchstochnen?].148 A quality of this hellfugitive is the unspeakability of his name; this signifier is prohibited.

In “The Question of Lay Analysis,” Freud carries out a hypothetical conversation with an “impartial
person” about the practice of psychoanalysis. After Freud explains to this person that the analyst and the analysand
agree on a fixed hour in which the analysand talks and the analyst listens to the speech of the analysand, he remarks on
the reaction of this “impartial person”: “And no doubt he is thinking too of Mephistopheles’ mocking speech on how
comfortably one can get along with words…” [Es geht ihm gewiß auch die Spottrede Mephistos durch den Sinn, wie bequem sich mit
Worten wirtschaften läßt…] and he imagines that this person would say “So it is a kind of magic; you [the analyst] talk, and
blow away his ailments” [Das ist also eine Art von Zauberei, Sie reden und blasen so seine Leiden weg]. Freud, Gesammelte Werke,
Vol. 14: 212. In what follows in this essay, Freud evokes some distant past when the Word once took precedent over the
Act, and then becomes displaced by them, and this is what happens in Faust’s translation of the Greek bible. In the
psychoanalytic discourse, according to Freud, the Word returns to its ancient primacy over the Act once again; the Act is
translated back into the Word.
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It is precisely in this crisis of the word, in the act of naming-without-really-naming, that
Mephistopheles appears in his human form. The spell’s words prompt Mephistopheles to change
shape, effectively translating himself from poodle into man. But Mephistopheles’s own sign—his
name—still remains unknown. In this passage, Mephistopheles is not explicitly named as “devil”;
rather, he is called “a fugitive from Hell” [Ein Flüchtling der Hölle].149 There is something about
Mephistopheles that defies signification. Indeed, “What do you call yourself” [Wie nennst du dich] is
Faust’s first question to Mephistopheles.150 But Mephistopheles rejects the question using Faust’s
own logic. Mephistopheles answers: “That seems a petty question / from one who is so scornful of
the word / and who, aloof from mere appearance, / only aspires to plumb the depths of essence”
[Die Frage scheint mir klein / Für einen der das Wort so sehr verachtet, / Der, weit entfernt von allem Schein, /
Nur in der Wesen Tiefe trachtet].151 Mephistopheles does not refuse to speak his name, he merely points
out a contradiction: why would someone who cares only for the signified ask about something as
arbitrary as a name? Faust adjusts his question according to Mephistopheles’s critique and asks now
“who are you” [Wer bist du denn?].152 Mephistopheles refuses to reveal his name, so Faust asks him
about his essence.
Mephistopheles provides three answers:
1. I am “A part of that force / which, always willing evil, always produces good”; “I’m a part of
the Part that was all, / part of the Darkness that gave birth to Light—” [Ein Teil von jener
Kraft, / Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft; Ich bin ein Teil des Teils, der Anfangs alles war,
/ Ein Teil der Finsternis, die sich das Licht gebar].153
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2. “I am the spirit of Eternal Negation” [Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint!].154
3. “my essence is / what you call sin, destruction, / or—to speak plainly—Evil” [So ist denn alles
was ihr Sünde, / Zerstörung, kurz das Böse nennt, / Mein eigentliches Element].155
These answers are incongruous. There is a contradiction in the Part Mephistopheles is part of, that
once was “all” [alles]: what it wills is not what it produces. Mephistopheles and the Part are both
eternally negating, but what the Part negates is the evil that it wills—or perhaps it negates its very
will—and the result of the negation is “good.” A double negative yields a positive. Does
Mephistopheles, only part of the Part, also will evil while producing good? Whereas the
contradiction in the Part’s Kraft between good and evil is moral, Mephistopheles confronts a morally
neutral contradiction between “Something” [Etwas] and “Nothing [Nichts].156 Mephistopheles’
morally neutral contradiction negates the Part’s moral contradiction. There is no single
contradiction, but rather an un-ending process of eternal negation; the contradictions flow like
blood out of Mephistopheles’ gaping “Nichts.” But no matter how much Mephistopheles negates,
there is always a force persisting: “To think how many I’ve buried, / yet fresh young blood keeps
circulating. / On and on—it could make anyone see red!” [Wie viele hab’ ich schon begraben! / Und immer
zirkuliert ein neues, frisches Blut. / So geht es fort, man möchte resend werden!].157 Mephistopheles’s principal
problem has to do with ever-circulating blood. The blood has a circular direction—this cyclical
motion is what keeps it fresh and perpetually wieder neu. It can also be said that life repeats itself, in
the same way that a point moving along a circular path will find itself in the same position again and
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again. With circulating blood and circulating life, repetition is at work; for Mephistopheles, the
never-ending repetitive cycle of the blood is a problem—it happens against his will.158
Although it might sound like yet another Mephistophelean contradiction, it is no accident,
considering Mephistopheles’s predicament, that blood is the chosen medium for his contract with
Faust. Even though blood and Mephistopheles have a history, where blood flows onward regardless
of Mephistopheles’s powers of destruction, Mephistopheles nonetheless suggests the liquid of blood
for Faust’s signature; blood is, in the end, a more stable guarantor than the word. This contract is as
follows: Mephistopheles agrees to serve Faust on earth so long as Faust serves him “beyond”
[drüben].159 Faust adds a wager onto their contract: the day that Mephistopheles successfully lulls him
into complacency will be his “last day” [letzte Tag].160 According to this contract and wager, Faust and
Mephistopheles bind themselves together. Mephistopheles says “I’ll bind myself to serve you here”
[Ich will mich hier zu deinem Dienst verbinden] and urges Faust to bind or commit himself to the wager in
exchange [Verbinde dich].161 Faust agrees, but is concerned about the death of the word and the fact
that it “begins to die” [erstirbt schon] by the time it is written on the page: “The word begins to die
before it’s left the pen, / and wax and goatskin take control. What do you, evil spirit, want from
me— / marble or brass, foolscap or parchment? / You are at liberty to choose” [Das Wort erstirbt
schon in der Feder, / Die Herrschaft führen Wachs und Leder. / Was willst du böser Geist von mir? / Erz,
Mamor, Pergament, Papier? / Soll ich mit Griffel, Meißel, Feder schreiben? / Ich gebe jede Wahl dir frei].162 Faust
bemoans the ephemeral mortality of the word, and he turns to Mephistopheles with his dilemma.
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Mephistopheles’s solution to this problem is, of course, blood. As Mephistopheles revealed
before, blood contains in it something immortal; after all, no matter how many people die, blood
continues to circulate. Therefore, Mephistopheles urges Faust to sign their contract with his own
blood:
How can you work yourself up so quickly
To this heat of rhetorical exaggeration?
Any small scrap of paper is alright.
A tiny drop of blood will do to sign your name.
Wie magst du deine Rednerei
Nur gleich so hitzig übertreiben?
Ist doch ein jedes Blättchen gut.
Du unterzeichnest dich mit einem Tröpfchen Blut.163
In this passage, blood binds Mephistopheles and Faust together; it is the very material of their
contract. A radical alternative to the word, Faust’s blood replaces his name and acts as his signature.
It is something that can be written, a signifier of identity, and a form of insurance. If Faust replaced
the Word with the Act in his translation of the Bible, the substitution that Mephistopheles and Faust
make here is between the Word and Faust’s blood. There is something about that “very special
juice” [ganz besondrer Saft] that works against death, destruction, and negation.164 Hence while the
substance within the vial is a deadly liquid Kraft, the blood here does seem to function as a liquid
Kraft of everlasting Life. This is very interesting, considering the fact that the blood was chosen by
the Negator-in-Chief Mephistopheles.165
In Faust’s earlier attempt to retranslate “In the beginning was the Word” [im Anfang war das
Wort] as “In the beginning was the Act” [im Anfang war die Tat], he did not completely replace the
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primacy of the word with the act; after all, “Act” is just another word.166 When Mephistopheles
enters the scene, we see exactly how the word can be displaced by act; in the act of signing the wager
with blood, the blood takes primacy over the word. The function of blood as a binding agent reveals
itself in this instance of the contract scene. Faust’s blood is what binds Mephistopheles and Faust
together; it is the substance that initiates the project of the drama, enabling the story to continue
onward.167 In the beginning of Faust’s journey was the blood: Am Anfang war das Blut.

Blutschuld von deiner Hand
Blood is also associated with heritage. What do we know about the inheritance in Faust? We
already know something about Mephistopheles’s lineage: when Mephistopheles changes to his
human form and introduces himself in Faust’s study, we learn that he is part of Mother Night, who
once gave birth to, and is now under siege by, the Light. But what is Faust part of? While
Mephistopheles is part of a maternal lineage, we only learn about Faust’s paternal lineage.
Specifically, we know that his lineage is haunted by the plague that once ravaged the village
traversed by Faust and his student Wagner in the scene “Outside the City Gate” [Vor dem Tor].
When we hear the story of Faust’s father, it is accompanied by yet another liquid, which an old
peasant gives to Faust with the hope that it will extend Faust’s life [Die Zahl der Tropfen, die er hegt, /
Sei euren Tagen zugelegt].168 The peasant gives Faust this drink in exchange for his work with his father
during the plague: “Many a man is here alive / who, at the time your father stopped the plague, /
was snatched by him at the last moment / from the burning frenzy of his fever” [Gar mancher steht

Goethe 1224; 1237.
In The Ego and the Id, Freud writes that the death drive is impossible to see except when it combines with
Eros: it “eludes our perception… unless it is tinged with eroticism.” Freud, The Ego and the Id, 121-22. The death drive
and Eros cannot ever be fully detangled, and it does seem that the death drive serves the binding process. When we
observe the way death drives the story onward, it does seem to be working as a life-propelling drive, as well. In this
inquiry on blood, it does indeed seem that death is an erotically binding force.
168 Goethe 988-90.
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lebendig hier, / Den euer Vater noch zuletzt / Der heißen Fieberwut entriß, / Als er der Seuche Ziel gesetzt].169
The peasant credits Faust’s father with stopping the plague, and he credits Faust, the “helper” [der
Hilfer], with surviving the plague: he “would enter every stricken house / and yet, although they
carried off so many corpses, / you always would come out unharmed” [Ihr gingt in jedes Krankenhaus, /
Gar manche Leiche trug man fort, / Ihr aber kamt gesund heraus].170 Just like the ever-circulating blood that
continues in spite of death, the young Faust continues to live in spite of the plague—he appears to
be immune.
Faust is respected for his family history, and he is treated in the village as a hero; as Wagner
notes when they pass by, there is a father pointing Faust out to his young boy, and the people are
throwing up their hats “as if the blessed sacrament were going by” [Als käm’ das Venerabile].171 172
Faust has inherited an honorable status from his father and from their role in the plague among the
villagers. But Faust’s memory of the plague is much different from the Old Peasant’s story. Faust
tells Wagner that the praise that he and his father receive is undeserved, because his father’s
alchemical medicines were only mystical speculations that ended up killing more people than they
healed:
That was our medicine—the patients died,
and no one thought to ask if anyone was healed.
And so, with diabolical electuaries,
we ravaged in these hills and valleys
with greater fury than the plague.
I have myself dosed thousands with the poison;
they wasted away—and I must live to hear
the brazen murders adulated
Hier war die Arzenei, die Patienten starben,
Ibid., 997-1000.
Ibid., 1006; 1002-4.
171 Ibid., 1021.
172 Interestingly the blessed sacrament in the Catholic Church is the blood and body of Christ in the form of
consecrated wine and bread at a celebration of the Eucharist.
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Und niemand fragte: wer genas?
So haben wir, mit höllischen Latwergen,
In diesen Tälern, diesen Bergen,
Weit schlimmer als die Pest gegeben,
So welkten hin, ich muß erleben
Daß man die freche Mörder lobt.173
According to Faust, his father’s medicines were actually more dangerous poison than the plague.
Faust calls these medicines “hellish” [höllisch], and he admits that he and his father were “murderers”
[Mörder]. For Faust, it is not honor that he has inherited from his father, but rather the Schuld of
murder.174 Faust is left to atone for the guilt but also pay back the debt of the murders that he and
his father committed.
Wagner hopes to console Faust with a hopeful idea of progress. Ever the Enlightenment
progressivist, he postulates that in youth one honors his father so that when he becomes a man, he
can augment the collective knowledge and surpass his father [Wenn du, als Jüngling, deinen Vater erst, /
So wirst du gern von ihm empfangen; / Wenn du, als Mann, die Wissenschaft vermehrst, / So kann dein Sohn zu
höh’rem Ziel gelangen].175 Wagner assures Faust that he must not be disturbed about his guilt, because
all he must do in order not to be schuldig is “augment our knowledge” [die Wissenschaft vermehrst],
reaching a higher mark than his father, so that his son [dein Sohn] might do the same. According to
Wagner’s philosophy, steps forward in the name of progress [Fortschritte] work against guilt and
function so as to pay back debt. But the idea that Faust’s progress might negate his Schuld over the
course of the play should be treated with some skepticism.
Faust is already skeptical of Wagner’s optimism here, and his skepticism is justified by his
father-child relationship later in the play. Faust does go on to have a child with Margarete, but the
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father-son progression is not carried out in the way that Wagner imagines. Faust impregnates
Margarete before marriage, leading to her imprisonment; it is Margarete who is schuldig according to
the law.176 Faust tries to attribute the Schuld to Mephistopheles—he blames Mephistopheles for
tempting them into sex. Mephistopheles rejects this displacement of guilt, re-invoking Faust’s family
history to bolster his point:177
And what about the risk you run? Guilt of blood spilled by your hand, still lies upon
the town! Avenging spirits hover where the slain man fell and lie in wait for the
returning murderer.
Und die Gefahr der du dich aussetzest? Wisse, noch liegt auf der Stadt Blutschuld von deiner
Hand. Über des Erschlagenen Stätte schweben rächende Geister und lauern auf den
wiederkehrenden Mörder.178
Not only has Faust, according to Mephistopheles, inherited his father’s Blutschuld, he is also
responsible for Margarete and the child he impregnated her with, for the death of her mother and
brother, for the fact that Margarete is now in jail, and he will be responsible for Margarete’s
execution. He is accountable for a great deal of spilled blood, past, present, and future; it is his fault
and his debt [Schuld] to carry. The fact that Faust has not adequately paid his debt means that the
blood “still lies upon the town” [noch liegt auf der Stadt].179 Until Faust’s debt is paid, spirits will hover
around him to avenge his wrongdoings. Faust, therefore, has inherited the Blutschuld of his father,
and he carries it on his hands. As we have seen, the hand is closely associated with the Kraft of
blood. A product of the force of the hand, though, is always Schuld. Faust is responsible for the acts
of his hand and he carries his father’s debt in his blood; for this reason, Faust is doomed to

176 This is also the predicament of Cervantes’s Leocadia in the short story “The Force of Blood” [La fuerza de la
sangre], from which the title of this chapter derives, when she is impregnated by a nobleman (unnamed “for the sake of
discretion,” but given the name Rodolfo for the sake of the story). Leocadia, though, manages to translate the dishonor
of her rape back into honor when she marries Rodolfo later in the story. In the end of the story, Cervantes writes that
their fortune together is something “granted by heaven and by the power of the blood which the valiant, noble, and
Christian grandfather of Louis [Leocadia and Rodolfo’s son] saw spilled on the ground.” Here blood functions as a
mediator here between earth and heaven.
177 Goethe 52-5.
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perpetually repeat acts of filial and genealogical Blutschuld until his father’s debt is paid.180 Faust now
faces the ethical dilemma of how he can atone for a Blutschuld.
Faust is not the only one affected by this guilt. In prison, Margarete takes this guilt upon
herself, claiming responsibility for the bloodshed. She admits “I am the one who killed my mother, /
I am the one who drowned my child” [Meine Mutter hab’ ich umgebracht, / Mein Kind hab’ ich ertränkt].181
But to what extent is Margarete actually responsible for these deaths? Although the “Gretchen
Tragedy” [Gretchen Tragödie] lures us to interpret the events as an infanticide, there is no narrative
certitude that Gretchen did, in fact, murder her child. Instead, we have only a gap between the
“Walpurgis Night Dream” [Walpürgisnachtstraum] and the “Expanse of Open Country” [Trüber Tag]
scenes. The statement “I am the one who drowned my child” [Mein Kind hab’ ich ertränkt] should be
treated with some doubt. Her statement right before, “I am the one who killed my mother” [Meine
Mutter hab’ ich umgebracht], after all, is only partially accurate; she tried to give her mother a sleeping
potion, but she ended up unintentionally poisoning her. It is more likely that Faust and
Mephistopheles are behind the mother’s death, since they concocted the potion as a means of
furthering their plan to sneak into Margarete’s room. Similarly, we do not have direct evidence that
Margarete drowned her child—this is only what the guards told her: “To hurt my feelings they took
it from me, / And now they’re saying I killed it” [Sie nahmen mir’s um mich zu kränken / Und sagen nun,
ich hätt’ es umgebracht].182 Nonetheless, Margarete attempts to take on the debt of her mother and

180 In a footnote in The Ego and the Id (1923b) Freud affirms the following: “The battle with the obstacle of an
unconscious sense of guilt is not made easy for the analyst. Nothing can be done against it directly, and nothing
indirectly but the slow procedure of unmasking its unconscious repressed roots, and of thus gradually changing into a
conscious sense of guilt… it must be honestly confessed that here we have another limitation of the effectiveness of
analysis; after all, analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the patient’s ego freedom
to decide one way or another” 50. In response to this illumination, analyst Miguel Gutierrez-Pelaez writes in Confusion of
Tongues: A Return to Sandor Ferenczi that “The unconscious sense of guilt is a deadly element of the death drive, impossible
to disentangle through psychoanalysis” (London: Routledge, 2018), 37.
181 Goethe 4507-4508.
182 Ibid., 4445-6.
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child’s deaths, thereby justifying her own execution. Margarete believes that there is blood on her
hands, but when Faust visits her in prison, she discovers something different:
Give me your hand. Yes, this is not a dream!
You dear, dear hand! But oh, it’s wet.
Wipe it off! I can’t help thinking
There’s blood on it.
Oh God, what have you done!
Put up your sword,
I beg you.
Gib deine Hand! Es ist kein Traum!
Deine liebe Hand! – Ach aber sie ist Feucht!
Wische sie ab! Wie mich deucht
Ist Blut dran.
Ach Gott! Was hast du getan!
Stecke den Degen ein;
Ich bitte dich drum! 183
Margarete becomes aware of Faust’s Blutschuld when she feels wet blood on his hands. Faust’s
Blutschuld is associated with an action [eine Tat], and Margarete demands to know what this action is
[Was hast du getan!]. What is interesting, though, is that in her realization of Faust’s Blutschuld,
Margarete still seems to will her own death. Even when she realizes that there is blood on Faust’s
hands, she decides to take on Faust’s Schuld, and to pay back his debt with her own death.184 Perhaps
Margarete feels that she shares Faust’s guilt, because their blood is shared by their child: “Wasn’t the
baby given to us both, / to you as well? I can hardly believe it is you!” [War es nicht dir und mir
geschenkt? Dir auch—Du bist’s!].185 Margarete assumes Faust’s Schuld as her own.
Faust’s Blutschuld is what connects Faust with his lineage, and it is also subject to being
repeatedly misrecognized by the people around him. While Margarete ultimately misrecognizes
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Faust’s Schuld as her own, Wagner initially misrecognized Faust’s Schuld as honor. Faust’s father was
a murderer— he passed his Schuld to his son, and Faust is fated to repeat his father’s blutschuldig
actions. Wagner’s hope that the Schuld Faust inherited from his father will be cancelled out with his
own striving does not come to fruition. Faust’s Schuld does not become the responsibility of his
child; instead, it mistakenly becomes Margarete’s. By assuming that Faust’s debt is her own, and by
attempting to assume Faust’s Schuld in her death, Margarete attempts to render Faust’s debt in the
dative case.186 But this is impossible. Faust’s Schuld is his own burden to carry, and he carries it
beyond Margarete’s death.187
Thus, pumping through the play is the force of blood. In the force of blood, we notice an
intricate dynamic that involves death, Schuld, and the hand. Spilled blood connotes death. To spill
blood means to murder violently. Schuld appears where blood is spilled, and it appears on the hands
as blood. To have blood on one’s hands means to be schuldig. There is something about Blutschuld
that is prone to repeated misrecognition. It becomes clear that although Schuld may be passed from
one person to another, through the blood of genealogy or filiation, death cannot be displaced,
substituted, or in any way transmitted.

Aufgeregtes Blut
I hope to have established a movement of blood through time in the form of Faust’s lineage,
which stretches back to his father’s Blutschuld and forward to his son’s death. There is a tension in
the nature of that movement, though. On the one hand, blood, as I have discussed, circulates
repetitively through the body and, in the context of inheritance, repeats itself in the next generation.
On the other hand, blood’s movement is progressive—it is “moving ever onward” [drängt immer

186 This is idea is similar to Heidegger’s concept of death’s dative from Being and Time that Derrida explains in
Gift of Death and Literature in Secret, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 43-44.
187 Ibid., 44. Heidegger speaks about the irreplaceability and Eigentlichkeit of death in Being and Time.
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vorwärts]. Blood has pressure, and one might even say that blood strives. Here I am reminded of the
two narratives put forth by Wagner and Faust regarding the expiation of Faust’s father’s Schuld: will
it repeat over and over again, as Faust fears, or will it be overcome through ever stronger filial
striving? Later in the play, Faust is left alone with this question as he gazes at the ocean’s waves:
The ocean far below attracted my eye;
It surged and rose to towering heights,
Then it abated, scattering its waves,
That hastened to assault the low, broad shore.
And I was vexed—for arrogance,
Unbridled blood, will always cause
Uneasy feelings in a spirit
That, though free, respects all laws and rights.
I thought it chance, but looking close I saw
The surge desist, and then roll back and leave
The goal it had so proudly reached;
At certain times what happens is repeated.
Mein Auge war aufs hohe Meer gezogen
Es schwoll empor, sich in sich selbst zu türmen.
Dann ließ es nach und schüttete die Wogen,
Des flachen Ufers Breite zu bestürmen.
Und das verdroß mich. Wie der Übermut
Den freien Geist, der alle Rechte schätzt,
Durch leidenschaftlich aufgeregtes Blut
Ins Mißbehagen des Gefühls versetzt.
Ich hielt’s für Zufall, schärfte meinen Blick,
Die Woge stand und rollte dann zurück,
Entfernte sich vom stoltz erreichten Ziel;
Die Stunde kommt, sie wiederholt das Spiel.188
Faust finds the sea, just like the vial from Faust I, irresistible. Both the sea and the vial attract Faust’s
eye: he said about the vial, “does that vial act as a magnet on the eye?” [Ist jenes Fläschchen dort Augen
ein Magnet] and here, “The ocean far below attracted my eye” [Mein Auge war aufs hohe Meer gezogen]..
Earlier, the sight of the vial eases Faust’s “turbulence of spirit” [Des Geistes Flutstrom ebbet nach und
nach], lessens his “striving” [das Streben wird gemindert], and transports him to a similar vision of the
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“open sea” [hohe Meer] which “sparkles” below him [Die Spiegelflut erglänzt zu meinen Füßen]. But this
instance with Faust and the sea is not just a repetition of the scene with the vial; there are key
differences.
The turbulence that was in Faust’s spirit shows itself in the ocean: it is surging, towering,
assaulting, and it “storms” the shore [Dann ließ es nach und schüttete die Wogen, / Des flachen Ufers Breite
zu bestürmen].189 While the vial and the peaceful vision of the sea lessened Faust’s striving, this sea
frustrates him [Und das verdroß mich] (10202). Faust locates the source of the frustration within
himself: “And I was vexed—for arrogance, / Unbridled blood, will always cause / Uneasy feelings
in a spirit” [Und das verdroß mich. Wie der Übermut / Den freien Geist, der alle Rechte schätzt, / Durch
leidenschaftlich aufgeregtes Blut / Ins Mißbehagen des Gefühls versetzt] (10202-5). Faust’s blood is the source
of his anger at the withdrawing ocean. The motion of the sea is stifled, and its surges and retreats are
repeated: “At certain times what happens is repeated” [Die Stunde kommt, sie wiederholt das Spiel].190 Is it
the pressure of his “unbridled blood” that most distresses him? If it were merely the pressure of his
blood that distresses him, the abatement of the surge should be reassuring, just as his “striving” was
“lessened” [Streben wird gemindert] in the vial scene. Or—and this seems more likely—is it the
repeated thwarting of his excited blood that is trying his patience? Close examination of the passage
reveals that in fact both motions are to blame for Faust’s annoyance [Verdruss]. The spontaneous
welling up of the blood’s power quickly becomes an excessive arrogance [Übermut] that inevitably
displaces the mind’s freedom of movement with a deflating unease.
Far from being deterred by the sight of the excessive force crashing in on itself, Faust begins
to plot a way to capture the “power” [Kraft] that drives the waves by isolating it and holding it in his
hands. This would allow him to dominate the ocean: he announces that the sight “has inspired me to
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venture to new heights, / To wage war here against these forces and subdue them” [Da wagt mein
Geist sich selbst zu überfliegen, / Hier möcht’ ich kämpfen, dies möcht’ ich besiegen].191 Faust decides to wage
war on the ocean, he desires to capture its power and its Kraft; Faust’s fantasy is that he will be able
to use the ocean’s Kraft not to power his own striving, but to master his own “unbridled blood”
[aufgeregtes Blut].192 Thus, Faust sets out to capture the Kraft of the ocean—a force that he finds
outside of himself, in Nature. Faust is interested in harnessing all of Kraft both within and without
his body. The effect of this mastery over both blood and ocean, counterintuitively, is freedom.193
What is Faust’s concept of freedom in his encounter with the ocean?
According to Faust’s line of thinking, the ocean is not free because of its turbulence. Faust
finds a parallel to the ocean’s tempestuousness in his own unbridled blood, whose arrogance
[Übermut] displaces [versetzet] his free spirit [der freie Geist], leaving him with an “uneasiness of feeling”
[Ins Mißbehagen des Gefühls] akin to the ocean’s ebb. In both the cases of the ocean and the blood,
excitement turns freedom into manic arrogance which then crashes down like a wave into its own
depletion. Faust is trying to rescue the freedom of spirit: the ocean’s spirit and his own. Faust aims
to break the repetitive turbulent cycle of excess and deficiency by channeling the Kraft within the
ocean and his blood.194 Faust’s project of mastery over the ocean is ultimately a project of freedom
from repetition.
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193 In the beginning of their journey, Mephistopheles tells Faust that he will teach him how to be free in life:
“Take my advice and get yourself / an outfit similar to mine, / so that, released from bondage, you can learn / what life
and freedom really are” [und rate nun dir, kurz und gut, / Dergleichen gleichfalls anzulegen; / Damit du, losgebunden, frei, / Erfahrest
was das Leben sei]. Goethe 1540-3. At their journey’s end, Faust crafts a very different kind of freedom.
194 This is a gesture of sublimation in Freud’s terminology.
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Ein Ozeanisches Gefühl
As we have discussed, there are two key ocean scenes in Faust: first, when Faust imagines a
calm ocean at the beginning of the play when he contemplates the vial, and second, when Faust
comes into direct contact with the ocean later in the play and declares mastery of the ocean as his
next venture. Faust has a very special relationship with the ocean, and it is therefore fitting that his
adventure begins and ends with an oceanic feeling.195
Faust ventures to protect the land from the destructive ocean. He orders the Lemures and
their “overseer” [Aufseher] Mephistopheles to build a massive dike between the shore and the waves,
in order to limit the ocean and prevent it encroaching on the shore. Mephistopheles, literally seeing
over into Faust’s future, knows something that Faust does not know: this project is Faust’s last.
Mephistopheles prophetically jokes that Faust is not directing the construction of a dike (translated
“canal” in the English), but he is instead digging his own grave: “The word I heard was more banal:
they mentioned graves [Grab], not some canal [Graben]” [Man spricht, wie man mir Nachrichten gab, /
Von keinem Graben, doch vom Grab].196 And this play on words turns out to bear some truth; as Faust
professes his project of mastering the ocean, he realizes that he has found a way to access a certain
form of immortality—he has found a way to live on past his death in the form of a legend:
A marsh stretching along those mountains
Contaminates what’s been reclaimed so far;
To drain that stagnant pool as well
195 In the second paragraph of Civilization and its Discontents [Das Unbehagen in der Kultur], Freud recalls an
“oceanic feeling” that one of his Romain Rolland described to him in a letter, after having read his 1927 text on the
Future of an Illusion: “It is a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of ‘eternity’, a feeling as of something limitless,
unbounded — as it were, ‘oceanic’. This feeling, he adds, is a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith; it brings with
it no assurance of personal immortality, but it is the source of the religious energy which is seized upon by the various
Churches and religious systems, directed by them into particular channels, and doubtless also exhausted by them” [Diese
sei ein besonderes Gefühl, das ihn selbst nie zu verlassen pflege, das er von vielen anderen bestätigt gefunden und bei Millionen Menschen
voraussetzen dürfe. Ein Gefühl, das er die Empfindung der „Ewigkeit“ nennen möchte, ein Gefühl wie von etwas Unbegrenztem,
Schrankenlosem, gleichsam „Ozeanischem“. Dies Gefühl sei eine rein subjektive Tatsache, kein Glaubenssatz; keine Zusicherung
persönlicher Fortdauer knüpfe sich daran, aber es sei die Quelle der religiösen Energie, die von den verschiedenen Kirchen und
Religionssystemen gefasst, in bestimmte Kanäle geleitet und gewiss auch aufgezehrt werde]. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 1-2. Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Frankfurt: Marix Verlag, 2010), 9-10.
196 Goethe 11557-8.
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Would be a crowning last achievement.
If I can furnish space for many millions
To live—not safe, I know but free to work
In green and fertile fields, with man and beast
Soon happy on the new-made soil
And settled in beside the mighty hill
A dauntless people’s effort has erected,
Creating here inside a land of Eden—
Then there, without, the tide my bluster to its brim,
But where it gnaws, attempting to rush in by force,
Communal effort will be quick to close the breach.
Ein Sumpf zieht am Gebirge hin,
Verpestet alles schon Errungene;
Den faulen Pfuhl auch abzuziehn
Das Letzte wär das Höchsterrungene.
Eröffn’ ich Räume vielen Millionen,
Nicht sicher zwar, doch tätig frei zu wohnen.
Grün das Gefilde, fruchtbar; Mensch und Herde
Sogleich behaglich auf der neusten Erde
Gleich angesiedelt an des Hügels Kraft,
Den aufgewälzt kühn-emsige Völkerschaft.
Im Innern hier ein paradiesisch Land,
Da rase draußen Flut bis auf zum Rand,
Und wie sie nascht gewaltsam einzuschießen,
Gemeindrang eilt die Lücke zu verschließen.197
Faust imagines that his name will be remembered as the one who finally dictated the ocean’s
borders, protected the land from the waves, and symbolically delineated the relationship between life
and salty oceanic death. But Faust’s miraculous realization does not come as a discovery of some
kind of immortality; likewise, Faust does not imagine that the barrier he is building between the land
and the waves will last forever. On the contrary, Faust hopes that people will repair the barrier
everyday anew, constantly strengthening it in spite of erosion by the elements; Faust’s final wisdom
rests on the idea that the barrier will give these people a way of symbolically preventing and
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postponing death. Faust declares the ultimate knowledge when he says: “To this idea I am
committed wholly, / it is the final wisdom we can reach: / he, only, merits freedom and existence /
who wins them every day anew” [Ja diesem Sinne bin ich ganz ergeben, / Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluß: /
Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben, / Der täglich sie erobern muß].198
Faust’s final realization, therefore, is that freedom is a repetitive pursuit; people must
constantly work together to repair the dike between the land and the ocean, just as they must
repetitively seize freedom every day. Whereas Faust thought he was searching for a freedom from
repetition, he instead finds a freedom to repete. In this final realization, Faust finds an alternative to
the striving that dictated his movement throughout the text. Faust’s ultimate wisdom is also what
allows him to find his own death. This takes me to a crucial question: how, exactly, does Faust die?
Faust’s last words in his human form are the following:
If only I might see that people’s teeming life,
Share their autonomy on unencumbered soil;
Then, to the moment, I could say:
Tarry a while, you are so fair—
The traces of my days on earth
Will survive for eons!
Envisioning those heights of happiness,
I now enjoy my highest moment.
Solch ein Gewimmel möcht ich sehn,
Auf freiem Grundmit freiem Volke stehn.
Zum Augenblicke dürft’ ich sagen:
Verweile doch, Du bist so schön!
Es kann die Spur von meinen Erdetagen
Nicht in Aonen untergehen. –
Im Vorgefühl von solchem hohen Glück
Genieß ich jetzt den höchsten Augenblick.199
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My claim is that Faust’s final wisdom allows him to die his own death, and this death that Faust
finds for himself is ultimately a creative death.200 Faust finds an alternative method of movement to
the striving that dictated his path previously throughout the drama. His striving was forward
pressing, driving, and each one of his new ventures functioned merely as a repetition of his last.
Before, Faust’s striving took the form of pressing ever onward, stepping ever onward, vowing never
to stop, always refusing and denying the possibility of his death. Perhaps Faust imagines that if he
never says “verweile doch, du bist so schön,” he would be able to evade death. Thus, Faust proceeds on
with a frenetic forward momentum, because he hopes to win his wager with Mephistopheles. If
Faust were to lose the bet, to address time directly and invite the moment to stay a while in all its
beauty, Faust would be submitting himself to his death, giving himself over to his last day. What
actually happens in the end of the story, though, is neither a denial of nor a submission to death.
Faust does not continue to deny his death in his forward-moving striving, refusing to say “verweile
doch.” But Faust also does not decide to merely say “verweile doch,” so as to submit himself to death.
Instead, Faust finds a creative alternative: he decides to speak the words of “verweile doch,” but in the
subjunctive mood: he says “I could say: / Tarry a while, you are so fair—” [Zum Augenblicke dürft’ ich
sagen: / Verweile doch, Du bist so schön!].201 Faust refuses to either strive [Streben] or stay [verweilen], and
he refuses to either deny or submit to death. Faust finds another way to die, his own way, in the
subjunctive mood: he could die. The subjunctive mood is, after all, the language of possibility,
fantasy, and in the end, Faust’s freedom. The subjunctive mood, though, does not grant Faust a
possible escape from his death; the clocks stop, and Faust does die.
But even when the clocks stop, the story continues onward as Faust’s spirit rises. His
ultimate motion upwards, his Aufhebung, is the result of his ability, in the end, to understand death

200 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud writes that the self-preservative drive protects the organism’s ability to
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dialectically. In the realization that death must not be either denied or submitted to, Faust has
discovered an existential freedom, a way to live “actively free” [tätig frei] that is repetitively
constituted daily [täglich]. He has found his own creative death, and this death must be negotiated
every day. This death is not life-destroying like Mephistopheles predicts when he says “the end will
be annihilation” [Und auf Vernichtung läufts hinaus], but rather life-driving. In this final discovery of his
own death, Faust thinks death not as a destruction of the body, but as something which has always
existed within it. Faust felt this very death in the force of his blood, pulsing to the rhythm of his
heartbeat through his veins, those small Graben that direct the blood all throughout our bodies and
allow us our movement, weaving like red ribbons through our flesh, always signifying our mortality.
Goethe does not think death in Faust as either re-creation “beyond” or annihilation, as a
serene or a stormy ocean scene, or as something to which we must submit or whose possibility we
must deny; rather, Goethe thinks death dialectically and creatively, as something that emerges out of
the denial-submission polarity and constantly negotiates between them throughout the body of the
text and within our very mortal [sterbliche] bodies. Death is indeed the drive that draws Faust – and us
[uns] onward [hinan]: we might even call it the Todestrieb.
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A Death of One’s Own
The End of Beyond the Pleasure Principle
At the end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud turns to the “words of the poet,” writing “We
may take comfort, too, for the slow advances of our scientific knowledge in the words of the poet:
‘What we cannot reach flying we must reach limping. / The Book tells us it’s no sin to limp’” [Was
man nicht erfliegen kann, muss man erhinken. / Die Schrift sagt, es ist keine Sünde zu hinken].202 Freud uses the
words from Friedrich Rückert’s translation of al-Hariri as a source of comfort, as a way of justifying
the slow, limping progression of science, and, ultimately, as a way to end his text “in its own way”
[auf seine Weise].203 This gesture toward the literary at the end of the text, however, is not new; as we
have seen, it is repeated throughout the text with a certain persistence. Freud turns to the myth
Androgyne in his discussion of the conservative nature of the drive; he references Torquado Tasso’s
Gerusalemma Liberata as he unfolds his theory of the compulsion to repeat; and, of course, he quotes
Goethe’s Mephistopheles to describe the onward motion of the drive. When we read the poetry of
Rückert at the end of the text, we are reminded of these previous incursions of the literary; thus this
ending becomes less like an ending and more like a directive to read the text again regressively—to
read the text backwards, in order to adequately listen to what it is that Freud is doing with his poets.
We might recall other crucial moments when Freud turned to Shakespeare, Sophocles, and Goethe
and wonder about the status of literature and poetry [Dichtung] in Freud’s wider body of work.204
There is something concealed within these literary moments, something beyond what Freud means
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to say.205 Freud repeatedly turns to literature in the moments where his theory stumbles. It is clear
that this repetition is also a return, but it is not clear whether this repetition is a return to or a return
of the repressed. What is clear is that these literary navels within the text are bound up with each
other, and they have a daemonic quality about them.
As I detailed in my first chapter, Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle is a text about endings,
beginnings, and what happens and repeats in between; it is a text that provides us with a mode of
thinking death not just as an ending but also as a beginning. Freud posits the idea that the death
drive pulses throughout our lives, circulating and repeating itself, sometimes making “the task of
living more difficult” [die eine Erschwerung der Lebensaufgabe erzielen].206 What we learn from Beyond the
Pleasure Principle is that death is itself a repetition of an earlier state of things. The aim of the death
drive, which moves between birth and death proper, is to restore this prior state of inanimacy: “the
drive is an urge in organic life to restore an earlier state of things” [Ein Trieb wäre also ein dem belebten
Organischen innewohnender Drang zur Wiederherstellung eines früheren Zustandes].207 This idea leads Freud to
his first thesis, that “the aim of all life is death” [Das Ziel alles Lebens ist der Tod].208 What occurs
between birth and death are the detours that the organism takes throughout life. It is important,
though, that the detours do not lead toward an improper end—Freud writes that the organism
wishes to die only “in its own way” [auf seine Weise].209 These detours must not short-circuit the
organism’s life. We might wonder if this idea of the short-circuit, or a death that comes too soon,
lurks throughout Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle within its references to the literary.

205 Jacques Lacan: “It is obvious that in analytic discourse, what is at stake is nothing other than what can be
read: what can be read beyond what the subject has been incited to say.” See Lacan’s Seminar XX, (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1999), 29.
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Sabine Prokhoris writes: “It seems as if Freud calls the poets to his rescue whenever he
senses a weak spot in his reasoning, or finds himself disinclined to proceed scientifically.”210 Is the
end of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle the result of an end that came too soon—is this an
improper end to the text? Was Freud “haunted by Goethe’s ghost” as Avital Ronell claims in her
text Dictations: On Haunted Writing?211 Is the ghost of the Poet coming after Freud, in order to collect
its debt? Or was he seduced (led astray) by the words of the poet in such a way that terminated his
theoretical project in a kind of Liebestod? Before Freud quotes Rückert in the very last lines of the
text, he writes that “We must be patient and await fresh methods and occasions of research” [Man
muß geduldig sein und auf weitere Mittel und Anlässe zur Forschung warten], in order to find more answers.212
Freud urges his readers to patiently wait for science to catch up. Freud calls for patience, and he also
warns against stubbornness: “We must be ready, too, to abandon a path that we have followed for a
time, if it seems to be leading to no good end. Only believers, who demand that science shall be a
substitute for the catechism they have given up, will blame an investigator for developing or even
transforming his views” [Auch bereit bleiben, einen Weg wieder zu verlassen, den man eine Weile verfolgt hat,
wenn er zu nichts Gutem zu führen scheint. Nur solche Gläubige, die von der Wissenschaft einen Ersatz für den
aufgegebenen Katechismus fordern, werden dem Forscher die Fortbildung oder selbst die Umbildung seiner Ansichten
verübeln].213 It is not clear at the end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle whether or not he has perhaps
brought the text to “a not-good end” [nichts Gutem].214 Freud leaves his meta-psychological inquiry
open; he tells us that the science of posterity will carry his project through.
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Freud does carry his Beyond the Pleasure Principle to a proper end as a poetic text, though.
When Freud quotes Rückert, there could be no better end to this text, which is folded up in the
literary throughout. While Freud limps along at a rhythm, waiting for science to catch up with him,
he embeds the poet’s words within his own. Since biology will not answer Freud, or provide him
with sufficient evidence for his claim that there is in Eros a need to restore an earlier state of things,
he turns toward myth. In Plato’s Androgyne, he finds the search to recover a lost primal unity. Freud
apologizes for his mythopoetic detour, but he also acts pleased with positioning himself alongside
Plato as a “poet-philosopher.” The detours into poetry, myth, and literature are some of the most
crucial elements of Freud’s project in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Peter Brooks, in “Freud’s
Masterplot,” writes: “Beyond the Pleasure Principle is itself a plot which has formulated the dynamic
necessity of its own detour.”215 When we read the lines from Rückert at the end of the play, we are
compelled to return to all the other literary moments in the text which function as plot points
throughout Freud’s inquiry.
Freud already senses in Beyond the Pleasure Principle what he would conclude seventeen years
later in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” that the practice of analysis is inherently incapable
of coming to an end, because it always opens up more questions than it answers.216 The process of
Auflösung in analysis is never-ending. Psychoanalysis therefore needs literature to establish for itself
an end where there seems to be none. After all, this is precisely what Freud does at the end of Beyond
the Pleasure Principle. He acknowledges that he has not yet reached a good end to his theoretical
project, but he does not want to appear to leave his inquiry open. He references poetry from outside
the text, not in order to serve as evidence for his speculative endeavors in the place of science, but
rather to punctuate the story that he has narrated throughout the text. Poetry repeats itself
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throughout Freud’s text; because of this, it is through poetry that Beyond the Pleasure Principle finds its
own way to end. At the same time, it is poetry, and not science, that draws Freud hinan.

The End of Faust
Goethe’s Faust ends when Faust discovers how he can die his own death. What is Faust’s
own death, and how does he discover it? In the previous chapter, I wrote that Faust creates his own
death in a way that neither submits to death nor denies its inevitability; Faust actually affirms his
death as a possibility, and in doing so, he finds his freedom. When Faust pronounces the words to
end his bet with Mephistopheles “Stay a while you are so beautiful” [Verweile doch du bist so schön], he
does so in the subjunctive mood: he says that he could speak these words, asserting his choice either
to do so or not to do so.217 In Faust’s final pronouncement, he does not deny or negate death—he
affirms his death as his ultimate possibility. Faust never would have discovered this affirmation if he
were not allied with the Spirit of Negation, Mephistopheles.
Géza von Molnár in “Mysticism in a Secular Context and Goethe’s Metamorphoses of the
Circle: An Illustration with Reference to Faust” describes how this affirmation comes about.
Mephistopheles seems to be the only emissary from the unknowable realm, and he
turns out to be the principle of negation with which Faust must ally himself if he is
ever to encounter the “Yes” that supersedes it. This ultimate affirmation cannot be
addressed to any particular aspect of being; it cannot be, to paraphrase Plato’s
definition of absolute beauty, ‘yes’ here and ‘no’ there. Ultimate affirmation must
apply to being itself in its totality, which can only occur from a vantage point of the
Whole and not the part, not from the perspective of the mortal but the immortal.218
This “ultimate affirmation” at the hands of the “immortal” is exactly what we see at the end of the
play: the affirmation of being itself in its totality that directs Faust’s soul at the end of the play is
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carried out by the angels, spirits, and the “eternally feminine” [das Ewig-weibliche].219 The angels
proclaim that they are permitted to draw Faust’s spirit on because he has responded to the forces
from the heavens with unending striving.220 Faust kept the promise that he made at the beginning of
the play to strive ever onward: “It is to strive with all my might / that I am promising to do” [Das
Streben meiner ganzen Kraft / Ist g’rade das was ich verspreche].221 In the end, it is not any singular action or
even the greatest wisdom that redeems Faust from his Schuld; it is rather the sheer fact of his striving
that grants Faust redemption and his “ultimate affirmation.”
Von Molár writes that while the ultimate affirmation of being in its totality must be carried
out by the immortal, “the individual, who must judge from the viewpoint of the part, can only affirm
the Whole by negating its parts.”222 We might remember how, when Mephistopheles introduces
himself, he describes himself as “a part of the Part that in the beginning was all” [Ich bin ein Teil des
Teils, der Anfangs alles war].223 Faust’s path is characterized by a process of negating the parts in order
to affirm the whole, but this negation is part of a more complex dialectic, as well:
This is a positive negation, quite different from negation that is equivalent to despair.
It is negation affirmed, an acceptance of negation that extends not to any particular
but over the entire range of partiality itself. Simultaneous affirmation and negation is
at the heart of the dialectic process Goethe refers to as striving, a process that does
not allow for a goal implicit of cessation in its attainment.224
When Faust utters his last words, he affirms the final negation of his being; he affirms the
inevitability of his death. When Faust says ‘yes’ to the moment in the subjunctive mood and asks it
to stay a while, he is also affirming the finitude of time with respect to being. Paradoxically, it is
through this affirmation of the moment’s finitude that it has the possibility to infinitely stay. Only in
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the subjunctive mood could the moment stay. When Faust thinks about the result of his last wisdom,
he presents an illustration of a new way of being: he envisions a mode of being where human-kind
works together to constantly ward off the threat of death, neither denying the fact that death will
mark the end of life nor despairingly submitting to it.
In Faust’s affirmation of death, he also affirms the finite nature of the time that contains the
human being. Actually, finitude in Faust takes both temporal and spatial forms. At the beginning of
the play, Faust was unable to tolerate finitude spatially. He rejected his cramped study and sought a
mode of existence free from human confinement. In the end, though, discovering a certain
confinement within the finitude of time and space is exactly how Faust affirms his freedom. Faust
realizes, as he constructs the dam between the land and the ocean, that he must constantly affirm
and re-affirm his status of being within the finite nature of time and space, and humankind must
continuously affirm and accept, but also defend themselves against, the encroaching ocean and
potentiality of death, every day. In the construction of this dam, Faust is also actively delineating the
finitude of human existence; he is literally building its boundaries. Von Molár writes:
No matter how limited an individual’s sphere of activity, as long as it is not permitted
to confine its agent to inaction through inducing either a false sense of final
accomplishment or the conviction of its ultimate futility, striving, that is to say, free
agency affirming the self within its limits as an integrated and interrelated part of the
universe, is possible.225
Faust’s striving involves the task of continuously finding freedom through activity. This is a task in
which humankind must engage together; people must stand together, united against the waves
crashing against the dam. This freedom involves the affirmation of negation; it is therefore fitting
that Faust was required to ally himself with the Spirit of Eternal Negation in order to find this last
affirmation. Der Herr charges Mephistopheles with the task of prodding Faust onwards, thereby
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directing Faust’s journey as a course through negativity from the very outset. But there is nothing
futile about Faust’s path through negativity. Faust’s negations serve the goal of affirming the whole.
Once Faust finds this freedom, the angels descend from heaven in order to carry Faust’s
spirit upwards and onwards. It is only once Faust has discovered this freedom that he can unite with
this new immortal unity of all being. In Faust’s discovery of his inherent freedom, and in his
affirmation of death and the limited nature of being in time, Faust has found a way to create his own
death. Faust’s “own death” consists of an ascension into freedom, heaven, and unity. Faust creates
this death for himself through an affirmative path of constant negation. Faust’s final affirmation in
his death also marks the end of the play.

Reading and Nachträglichkeit
Both Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Goethe’s Faust find their proper ends. And yet,
both endings send us back through the text—they each necessitate the process of re-reading. The
end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, just like the end of Faust, makes a linear reading impossible.
Freud’s ending involves a repetition of the literary event; because Freud ends with the literary, he
emphasizes the status of his Beyond the Pleasure Principle not only as a scientific text, but also as a
mythopoetic text. Freud states that the “the aim of all life is death” [Das Ziel alles Lebens ist der Tod],
and that death is a repetition of “an earlier state of things” [eines früheren Zustandes].226 Can we then
make the claim first, that the text itself aims at its end, and second, that its literary ending is merely a
repetition of an earlier state of things? If we choose to pursue this line of thinking, we might
speculate about the text’s origin. We know that the literary does repeat with a certain persistence
throughout the text, but does literature also constitute the text’s origin? This is the speculation that
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the ending of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle necessitates. This line of thought is nachträglich—it
takes place in the after math, aprés coup.
But Freud’s Beyond does not only end in poetry—poetry also can be found in the origin of
Freud’s concept of the death drive. Specifically, there is solid evidence for the claim that Goethe’s
Faust functions as a certain origin for Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Freud quotes the play
explicitly after he has identified both the death drive and the sexual (life) drive as conservative forces
that seek to restore a previous state of things. According to Brooks, when Freud uses Goethe’s
language to say that the drive is “always pressing forward” [ungebändigt immer vorwärts dringt], he is
deconstructing the tendency to believe that humans drive toward perfection, along the lines of
Goethe’s striving Faust.227 228 Perhaps this is what Freud intended to do when quoting
Mephistopheles’s words; however, I claim that this quote reveals to us something about Freud’s
project that has been concealed. This quote functions like a navel, and it speaks something more
primary about Freud’s theoretical project: the story of Faust, surely one of the most quoted literary
works in Freud’s oeuvre, functions as “an earlier state of things” [eines früheren Zustandes] for
psychoanalytic theory.229 We learned in Beyond the Pleasure Principle that the organism’s repetitions
operate according to the conservative nature of the drives, and this is how we must read the
repetitive allusions to the literary in the text itself. I do not wish to claim that Goethe fathered
psychoanalysis—but he was by Freud’s side when psychoanalysis was conceived.230
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The ending of Faust, like the ending of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, requires us to read with
Nachträglichkeit.231 I propose that in the play’s last lines, “the eternally feminine draws us on” [das
Ewig-weibliche zieht uns hinan], motion “hinan” is also motion backwards through the text. As I have
discussed, what propels Faust onwards and upwards is ultimately an affirmation of the via negativa.
Faust rises into the heavens at the end of the play not because he has found the meaning of his life,
but because he has exhausted his possibilities in the world in his striving. Faust’s apophatic striving,
though, as I have discussed, is actually a process of affirming the whole by negating its parts; Faust
only can affirm the whole of his being by negating the possibilities of his existence one by one.
According to this idea, Faust’s journey on Earth must be negative for his journey in heaven, directed
onward by “the eternally feminine” [das Ewig-weibliche] rather than Mephistopheles, to be positive. At
the end of the play, we begin to understand the meaning of Faust’s pact with Mephistopheles, who
is “the spirit who is always negating” [der Geist der stehts verneint].232 Whereas we were led to think,
upon first reading of the play, that Faust’s striving was essentially creative while Mephistopheles’s
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negation was essentially destructive, we see by the end how Faust’s creation and Mephistopheles’s
destruction are dialectically intertwined in Faust’s negative striving. This interpretation of Faust’s
striving necessitates the process of re-reading and re-interpreting the story. We go back to the pact
scene, back again to the Prologue in Heaven [Prolog im Himmel], and we wonder about the
relationship between Der Herr and our friend Mephistopheles. Due to this “ewige” process of rereading, Faust is a text that can never be exhausted. It must be read and re-read every day anew. In
this way, reading Faust can be just like working “actively free” [tätig frei] to repair the dam between
the ocean and the land.233
According Freud’s work in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, passive repetitions have a daemonic
character, and they give the impression of a “perpetual recurrence of the same thing.”234 I make the
claim in my first chapter that repetitions within life carry the structure of death, as something that
repeats a state before life. When we repeat, we are either passively or actively dealing with death
within life in a structural way; when we encounter the structure of death within life in the form of
repetition, we are encountering the death drive. But what has our inquiry on literature added to this
discussion of repetition and the death drive? Books claims that “Narrative always makes the implicit
claim to be in a state of repetition, as a going over again of a ground already covered: a sjuzet
repeating the fabula, as the detective retraces the tracks of the criminal.”235 Narrative has the structure
of repetition, as do poetic devices: rhyme, alliteration, assonance, meter, refrain take us in our ear, in
our mouth, and in our eye back to something earlier in the text.236 The act of reading requires us to
recall earlier moments in the text; with each new literary allusion in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, we are
reminded of those that came before it. The insistence of the poetic throughout Freud’s text indicates
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to us that the poetic ending was anticipated from the beginning. The beginning of Freud’s text
presupposes its end. And when we think about the idea of the “end” in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, it
is hard not to think of the death of the organism as well, which sets the death-drive into its repetitive
motion throughout life. This is how we can read Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle: the text itself
builds a metaphor for its own meta-psychological theory; it performs the same structure of
beginning, ending, and repeating that it theorizes.
I am proposing a method of reading Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Faust in light of their
respective ends; these endings might shed “more light”—“mehr Licht,” as Goethe is reputed to have
said just before he died—on the relationship between reading and death. According to Walter
Benjamin in “The Storyteller” [Der Erzähler], we seek in literature the knowledge of death that we
cannot find in our own lives, because death is the “authority” of narrative [Der Tod ist die Sanktion von
allem, was der Erzähler berichten kann. Vom Tode hat er seine Autorität geliehen].237 Freud makes a similar
claim in his essay “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” when he writes:
It is an inevitable result of all this that we should seek in the world of fiction, in
literature and in the theatre compensation for what has been lost in life. There we
still find people who know how to die—who, indeed, even manage to kill someone
else… There alone too the condition can be fulfilled which makes it possible for us
to reconcile ourselves with death: namely, that behind all the vicissitudes of life we
should still be able to preserve a life intact. For it is really too sad that in life it should
be as it is in chess, where one false move may force us to resign the game, but with
the difference that we can start no second game, no return-match. In the realm of
fiction, we find the plurality of lives which we need. We die with the hero with
whom we have identified ourselves; yet we survive him, and are ready to die again
just as safely with another hero.
Es kann dann nicht anders kommen, als daß wir in der Welt der Fiktion, in der Literatur, im
Theater Ersatz suchen für die Einbuße des Lebens. Dort finden wir noch Menschen, die zu sterben
verstehen, ja die es auch zustande bringen, einen anderen zu töten. Dort allein erfüllt sich uns auch
die Bedingung, unter welcher wir uns mit dem Tod versöhnen könnten, wenn wir nämlich hinter
allen Wechselfällen des Lebens noch ein unantastbares Leben übrig behielten. Es ist doch zu
traurig, daß es im Leben zugehen kann wie im Schachspiel, wo ein falscher Zug uns zwingen kann,
237 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” in Illuminations, translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books,
1969), 101. Walter Benjamin, “Der Erzähler” (Berlin: Parthas Verlag, 2008), 119.
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die Partie verloren zu geben, mit dem Unterschied aber, daß wir keine zweite, keine Revanchepartie
beginnen können. Auf dem Gebiete der Fiktion finden wir jene Mehrheit von Leben, deren wir
bedürfen. Wir sterben in der Identifizierung mit dem einen Helden, überleben ihn aber doch und
sind bereit, ebenso ungeschädigt ein zweites Mal mit einem anderen Helden zu sterben. 238
According to Freud, reading involves a dealing with death; in reading, we can achieve a certain
immortality as we survive the hero with whom we have identified. In our repeated survival of our
heroes, we are playing a game with death, not entirely dissimilar from the previously discussed Fort!
Da! game. We might think that these two games are very different: while the little boy is mastering a
traumatic event that took place in the past and transforming the loss of his mother into an active
rather than a passive experience, the play in reading involves the attempt to master an anxiety about
something that has not yet occurred. What we learned in Beyond the Pleasure Principle though, is that
death is something which repeats “an earlier state of things” [eines früheren Zustandes].239 Death is not
just looming in the future—it has already taken place. In the act of reading, I suggest that we strive
to master our own death like the little boy playing the Fort! Da! game. This mastery does not
necessarily need to take the form of denial or submission to death. As Faust teaches us, there is
another way: we can actively work to prevent our death everyday by continuously repairing the
boundary between the land and the ocean—between life and death. Freud provides us with another
way to understand the wisdom at the end of his essay on war and death: “Si vis vitam, para mortem. If
you want to endure life, prepare yourself for death” [Wenn du das Leben aushalten willst, richte dich auf
den Tod ein].240

238 Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), Vol 14: 291.
239 Freud, BPP 43; JL 38.
240 At the end of “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” Freud writes that he has arrived at a “revision
of the old saying Si vis pacem, para bellum. If you want to preserve peace, arm for war” Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on
War and Death,” 300. This ending, also, requires “nachträglich” reading. Freud turns to language that exists outside the
text and rearticulates it, rewrites it, and revises it. It is in this “re” that the change takes place.
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When we read Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Faust together, we discover a way to think
death through the practice of reading. Narrative is structured by repetition, and the end of a story is
implied in the beginning. The endings of both Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Faust force their readers
to take their own via negativa and re-read—nachträglich. When we read we are dealing with repetition,
and we are dealing with death; in this way, we can understand reading as a practice of learning how
to die one’s own death. In this method of reading Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Faust together, the
dam between literature and psychoanalysis falls away: Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle is just as
much an intra-literary text as Goethe’s Faust is intra-psychoanalytic. As Shoshana Felman writes in
her text Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight: Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture, “the
methodological stake is no longer that of the application of psychoanalysis to literature but, rather, of
their inter-implication in each other.”241 The ocean’s tides come crashing onto the shore and threaten
our previously set boundaries. But this is why we must engage with the continuous process of
reading and re-reading, and we must destroy these boundaries in order to build them anew.

241

Shoshana Felman, Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight: Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture, 49.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhythm of the Fort! Da!
The Freudian death drive speaks through repetition—it operates within life, aiming to
restore a previous state of things—and, in this sense, it has a rhythm. The child’s game in Freud’s
Beyond the Pleasure Principle has a rhythm as well. The child sends his spool fort! and then pulls it back
da!; he also sends it fort! and fort! again without bringing it da! If we acknowledge the quality of
negativity involved in sending the spool away—a spool which we might consider metonymic for
Freud’s dead daughter, the child’s mother—we must attribute a corresponding quality of positivity
to the spool’s reappearance. But the child nevertheless repeatedly negates the negative motion away:
he too, like Mephistopheles acts as the “spirit that always negates.” Finally, Freud’s logic has a
rhythm. Freud goes fort!— into unexplored scientific territory, into the “waters of Schopenhauer’s
philosophy” [in den Hafen des Philosophie Schopenhauers], or into the world of poetry—and then comes
back to the Da! of his theory. 242 Like the child, Freud moves fort! more than he returns da!; there is a
limping rhythm in Freud’s striving. This rhythm of the Fort! Da! deals with what is on the other side,
jenseits, beyond. Indeed, the rhythmic structure of the Fort! Da! game enacts the very framework that
Freud describes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, of non-life yielding a life that presses ever forward, fort!
toward death. The rhythm of the Fort! Da! reveals the meter and rhyme—the heartbeat—of Freud’s
Todestrieb.
In Goethe’s Faust, the death drive speaks through the language of blood. It circulates and
repeats throughout the body of the text in poetic meter. This blood-poetry often signifies death; and
there is often something erotic about it as well. Faust finds that his blood is linked to the sea. Just as
his blood moves to the rhythm of a heartbeat, there is also a rhythm with the ocean’s waves. The
waves go fort! and da!, back and forth, back and forth. Faust sends them fort! actively when he
242

Freud, BPP 59; JL 53.
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constructs a dam between the sea and the land. Goethe’s poetry is not only rhythmic on the level of
its content, in the language of blood, it is also rhythmic in its poetic form.243 In Goethe’s meter and
rhyme, there is simultaneously similarity and difference: the beat stays the same while the sounds
change, or perhaps the sound of the words stays the same while the meaning changes. Some
material—either on the level of form or content—goes fort! so that material can emerge da!
The word rhythm comes from the Ancient Greek “ῥέω” (rhéō) meaning to flow, stream, or
gush.244 In Greek, rhythm flows like water and gushes like blood. But rhythm also flows in a
temporal way—it flows through time. We have the impression that time flows infinitely, without
stop or end or break, as continuously as the blood in our veins, but our everyday time-measures
introduce into this current a single motion and then a stop. The hands on our watches move then
stop, then move then stop, etc. On a digital clock, numbers flash onto the screen, and then
disappear, and then the next numbers appear. This is how we commonly understand rhythm: as a
flashing of instants, as a stimulus which comes and then goes, as a heart that throbs and then
releases. In rhythm, there is always a dialectic of being (da!) and nothingness (fort!).
This dialectic is at play also with Freud’s theory of the drive, which rests on the concept of
the repetition compulsion. And we see this same dialectic at work when Faust erects a dam between
the ocean and the land. Faust sublimates the rhythm of the waves that disturb his free spirit and his
unbridled blood as they repeatedly move da! and fort! into the rhythm of everyday work on the dam
for his fellow human. Herein lies Faust’s final wisdom: the rhythm of everyday work is where
freedom really lies. The dam that Faust builds with the Lemures symbolically functions as a caesura,
a break between life and death. But this caesura is only an impartial break; it serves not to prevent

Among the twenty-six meters employed in Faust I, the most characteristic one is the Knittelvers, a funny
pentameter rhymed in couplets, full of irregularities. Goethe also uses the stately Madrigalvers, a meter rhymed in
couplets, with verses of four, five or six iambic feet. Goethe also used the Stanzenstrophe, a stanza consisting of eight
iambic pentameters rhyming “abababcc.”
244 See Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 100.
243

81
death, but rather to postpone it. Faust’s dam—working as a caesura—sublimates the rhythm of the
repeatedly crashing waves into the rhythm of everyday work to repair the dam. The work of rhythm
is enabled by the caesura, the break that punctuates the borders between land and water, life and
death. But Faust’s dam isn’t really a caesura, a “cut” in the rhythmic motion—maybe it could be
better notated by a musical corona (Italian: fermata). The musical corona implies a rhythmic stasis in
which the last note of a cadence is held in the conductor’s hands. Paul Celan shows us in his 1948
love poem, “Corona,” the function of this rhythmic stasis when he accelerates and crescendos into
the final lines of the poem: “It is time, that it be time. It is time” [Es ist Zeit, daß es Zeit wird. Es ist
Zeit]. The time collapses into these last lines until the corona on “time” [Zeit] in its third repetition.
There is a rhythm in Celan’s time that drives toward its own stasis.
And in these times of the coronavirus, it is as if a corona (Italian: fermata) were placed at the
ends of the musical phrases of everyday life. We are now experiencing a tonal and rhythmic stasis:
we are no longer singing, meeting, or gathering. It is the time of feeling the emptiness, the gap, the
loss of life that the virus has brought with it. Derrida asks in his “Choreographies” how we would
“breath without punctuation, without the multiplicities of rhythm, steps, how would we dance?”245
Indeed, music, speech, poetry, walking, and dancing—the materials of life itself—depend on
presence and absence, stimulus and release, and the space in between: this is the rhythm of Fort! Da!

245 Derrida, Jacques. “Choreographies,” Points… (Interviews, 1974-1994), ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peggy
Kamuf & others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) 97.
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